The publication on June 6, on our website, of proposals for an
Interim Administration for National Unity (IANU) for Sierra Leone (see page 3)
generated considerable public interest and favourable reactions. At about the
same time in Freetown, a conference of national organisations and civic leaders
was held, which again reached conclusions similar to those that we had made.
It, too, enthusiastically called for an interim government. But instead of
looking at this idea purely from a patriotic standpoint, some selfish
power-drunk politicians in the Kabbah administration began, and even now
continue, to trivialise it by threatening 'treason charges' against those who
support or suggest it. We dare them! This special edition of Focus is in
open defiance to their stupid threats. We challenge President Kabbah and his
Government to declare their stand on the crucial issue of whether every Sierra
Leonean citizen is entitled to a fundamental democratic right to express and to
hold a political opinion, including that about the present and future
governance of our country! Let's see the true nature of their acclaimed
so-called democratic colours on display.
FSL VOL 5 No 3
or Focus, pursuing the military option as a final solution for the civil war in
Sierra Leone is a dead-end and, in our view, not attainable. Current evidence
and past experience in both our country and other parts of the world, point to
that conclusion as inevitable.
As a nation
that is ravaged by warfare, we need to re- examine our consciences and seek
answers to some lingering questions: How come after all our previous
expeditions - Ecomog, UN, British/Westside saga, etc., we are still so far away
from establishing a peaceful and normal Sierra Leone? How is it that the RUF
and their allies still have the stomach to meet and survive our very best
efforts?
Partly in
defiance of the overwhelming military threats around them and partly in opposition,
and possibly due, to the starkly timid and irresolute political edifice that
masquerades as a government in Freetown, RUF and allied forces have shown a
willingness to fight to the death and carry with them the hapless civilians who
live in their areas of operation. Thus without negotiation and a peaceful end
to fighting, these areas will only be taken with the loss of not just rebel
lives (which will no doubt satisfy some, possibly most Sierra Leoneans!) but
also innocent civilians who have been caught behind rebel lines. It is not
right that those who have become victims, through no fault of their own, should
also be made to pay with their lives simply in order to make the rest of us
feel at ease.
Presently,
the reality is that there is yet no (existing) peace in Sierra Leone to enforce
or to keep. This probably begs the question, what is the role of the UN? But there is still peace to be made …and
had, which must be created from scratch. It cannot be created by force.
Although the use of force can potentially help to reclaim the vast swathes of
territory currently held by the RUF and its allies, it will do nothing to
blunt, or win, the minds and hearts of those who are dealing such terrible body
blows to Sierra Leone's nationhood and very existence. Moreover, we will have
to live with these people afterwards.
New
thinking needs to be done. More effort should be committed to the search for
peace than before, through new and transparent political initiatives that are
just as fully resourced as the ongoing preparations for warfare. The following pages of this edition put
forward the case for an interim government in order to help the country focus
its energy and resources on broadly based objectives for peace and unity.
Peace
creation requires us to seek to transform the conflict objectively - through
explaining and understanding its origins, the fact that it so readily spread
out to most parts of the country and refuses to go away, and the consequences
that it has wrought for everyone. This must be done without the emotionalism
and the (sometimes) deliberate obfuscation of the last ten years.
If,
as was often claimed, RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh was the main obstacle to
peace, why is it that now that he is at least for the moment out of the way, it
has not been possible to go all out and broker a new peace deal with everyone
else, even if new political concessions have to be made?
What
is so repugnant about having a peace 'deal' in Sierra Leone when virtually
every current and past conflict in the world has been attended by deals of
every description? Take for examples: Northern Ireland where known bombers and
killers were freed from jail to facilitate an end to the 40 years of terror in
that country; the current Israeli-Palestinian flare-up which is bringing all
kinds of closet peace makers out of the woodwork; the glaring absence of
disapproval by the international community which turned a blind eye and,
therefore, implicitly encouraged Libyan Colonel Mu'amar Quadafi's payment of
ransom (or as some people charged, 'blood') money' to Philippino rebels for the
release of European hostages; then again, some European /NATO leaders only this
October were even prepared, for the sake of peace and democracy in former
Yugoslavia, to let the former Serbian leader President Milosevic go to a safe
haven if he would concede to the 'democratic' wish of his country’s electorate.
Sierra
Leone too needs a deal, but not a sell-out. The Lomé Agreement tried to do just
that, but it was weak in that it did not include all parties in the conflict.
It was not appeasement, as was alleged. The violence had to be controlled and
eventually brought to an end. At least under Lomé the rebels were going to be
made accountable with the task of controlling the excesses of their fighters,
which Sierra Leoneans were could not make them do except upon outright military
victory. But Lomé was derailed, in part, by meddlesome individuals and
institutions. Undeniably, there has to be a trade-off for ending the fighting.
There
was a time when Sam 'Mosquito' Bockarie was the
problem and, deservedly, everybody's hate figure. Then he was removed from the
scene, not by the bellicose posturing of our over-inflated military egos but by
the RUF itself and the very people to whom he was a hero.
Lt Col
Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC also flirted with the RUF for a while but see,
now, what a proactive disciple for peace in Sierra Leone he has become! He is
doing so, despite the personal tragedy of the brutal, barbaric and totally
unjust execution of his elder brother and twenty-three other military officers
in October 1998, by a vengeful and uncompassionate President Kabbah and his
government. People talk about training a new army but never mention the fact
that the cream of the country's skilled and experienced officers was wiped out
in that mad fit of revenge. Koroma for his part is even now being buffeted on
all sides by whispering accusations of betrayal from some of the men he
commanded, including surviving members of the group that staged the coup
against Kabbah in May 1997 who released him from jail to lead them. His crime
is that he has opted, wisely in our view, to work for peace with and for the
very man (Kabbah) who, they charge, destroyed the lives of their colleagues.
Koroma's courage should be applauded and rewarded by him being brought more
prominently into a renewed and more focused quest for peace.
We
must also mention the thousands of civil servants who were, and still are
being, victimised by the unjust and vengeful acts of the restored Kabbah
government which, upon its return, selfishly and recklessly embarked on a witch
hunt against those who, in legitimate exercise of their personal freedom of
choice, had not found it sensible, possible, or even necessary to join the
fugitive government on its flight to Guinea following the May 1997 coup. We
should approach and win them over despite all that has happened before. If need
be we must cajole, entice and allure them – in fact do whatever it takes our
human ingenuity – to bring all of these people on board the peace process.
It
is not easy to make peace. It will be a protracted process. That is why, we
presume, there is impatience among Sierra Leoneans who see nothing else but the
use of force as their only recourse. Many have suffered in this war and most of
them are direct victims of it. But we must continue to prevail on them and
their inner reserves of goodwill, to engage in a new peace process for genuine
reconciliation. We must educate them, and ourselves too, because it will be
both a learning process and an experiment in human relations for everybody.
Those
who now see British ‘re-colonisation’ as the answer to their problems are
shortsighted and selfish. They only live for now and have no stake in the
future. But they must remember that Sierra Leone's independence is not up for
grabs. It is a legacy bequeathed to us, which was fought with the sweat and
tears of a previous generation, some of whom are still around. It is therefore
not for them to relinquish it. We foresee that, come the day when there is
realisation of the lack of control over their own country (and resources), the
present youth of Sierra Leone who have been effectively deprived of a decent
and peaceful childhood, will spare no effort to reassert their nationhood in a manner
reminiscent of the earlier struggles of their forefathers for independence.
Happily, the British have vigorously denied any suggestion of re-colonisation.
There is absolutely no reason to doubt that the present British government’s
intention and determination is solely to help Sierra Leone attain peace.
So,
by all means, let the international community continue to take keen, active and
supportive interest in Sierra Leone as they have done before. But let them also
encourage the Sierra Leonean people themselves to come to a homegrown solution
of their divisions, of which this war is a tragic consequence. It must be a
solution that draws upon our traditional methods of conflict resolution,
deriving from the society and the communities whence the rebels originally
came. This is the pragmatic approach to peace in which we expect the government
of the day to take the lead. On the contrary, they seem keener to do only the
things that ensure their permanent grip on power.
Nowadays,
the Kabbah government is more interested in taking over the mines than anything
else. The British seem to agree with this and seem to be working zealously to
this agenda. What if that too fails? And since no one wants to address this
question, we must assume that failure is not contemplated. So then they take
the mines. What next? Whose interest will the mines serve? How would the
expedition itself be paid for, now or in future? No doubt, with the proceeds
from exploiting the mines! But how much of that will then be left for the citizens
of Sierra Leone and for rebuilding their country and economy?
The fact that everyone wants victory
explains why, during the last three months of the rainy season when there has
been a dramatic lull in the fighting and the incidence of mutilations and amputations
greatly reduced, no serious sustained effort has been made to come up with new
political initiatives. No one, but for the brave efforts of
the struggling Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, has been minded
enough to capitalise on this brief respite from violence to instigate dialogue
and break the political (never mind, the military) impasse. Instead more
resources and effort, including manpower, have been put into the reinforcement
of battle lines. Now there is fresh panic as word spreads around about a
growing deficit in the ground strength of the UN force, with Indian and
Jordanian troops reportedly calling it a day. This has added more pressure on
the British to make their presence not only more visible but also permanent and
in greater numbers. The expectation is that “they should go in and finish the
rebels”. If only that were possible!
We
can’t keep on expecting others to do things for us when we do not show
sufficient care, concern and appreciation for our own predicament. Any observing
stranger to Sierra Leone very quickly comes to the conclusion that the real
problem of our civil war lies within and between Sierra Leoneans themselves. We
do not like each other.
Focus again affirms
that violence never pays and only, always, serves as a temporary cure. The
attendant causes of civil strife remain intact and soon reinvigorate and
reinvent themselves once the dust of civil war settles down. Among the present
authorities in Sierra Leone, there is a lack of new initiatives to motivate the
population into the direction of peace and reconciliation. It is a lethargy
that is aided in large measure by a miasma of incoherent and knee-jerk policies
that point more towards fire fighting than a long-term strategy to forestall
the resurgence of violence in the future.
AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION
FOR NATIONAL UNITY
(This article was first published on Focus on Sierra
Leone's website on 9/6/00 [ http://www.focus-on-sierra-leone.co.uk])
et us assume
that the RUF is beaten into the dust once and for all, as a result of the
concerted effort of the International Community led by the UN, with the very
active and public support of Great Britain. When this putative result is handed
down to the present Government of Sierra Leone, what might it do to harness the
precious opportunity thus presented to it? What plans has it in store right
now, which it will activate to enable it to seize this window of opportunity to
advance the cause of this long suffering nation? As far as we can see, none!
Interim
Administration for National Unity (IANU)
President
Tejan Kabbah must be persuaded that he has done his best but it is not enough,
and the time has come for his government to move aside to make way for new
minds, so that Sierra Leone's problems can be looked at with fresh insight.
What the country needs is a new interim administration to take charge of its
affairs while others are trying to bring the violence to an end in one way or
other. The present government appears to be afflicted by tunnel vision and does
not seem able to see the country's problems from the wider perspective.
As a matter of extreme
urgency, Focus on Sierra Leone calls
for the immediate creation of an Interim Administration of National Unity
(IANU) for a period of at least four years.
During the period of this interim government
that we propose, we strongly suggest that all partisan political activities
should be put on hold. In their place there ought to be:
a national consensus-driven process of
stock-taking;
a redefinition and prioritisation of
key national objectives;
the development of schemes to satisfy
the most basic needs of the people;
the inauguration of an on-going
process of formal national soul-searching; and
the initiation of a mandatory regime
of regular consultation with the masses.
There
has been no leadership in any of these directions.
Priority areas of policy for the next four
years should be clearly identified so that no one is left in doubt about what
the national agenda and goals are, for the whole and not just part of the
country or sections of its population.
Our call for an interim administration comes
after sounding opinions inside Sierra Leone, and here among Diaspora in the
United Kingdom, Europe and the United States. Admittedly, these soundings have
been limited in scope but even they point inexorably to a desperate call for
change and the involvement of Sierra Leone's best talents in the phase of
rebuilding the country. There is a sense of confusion, exasperation and
frustration over the lack of activity by the present cabinet to come up with
new ideas to demonstrate their sense of urgency, realism and commitment to
fundamentally reversing the parlous state of affairs in Sierra Leone.
The interim arrangement
that we are advocating will have the singular virtue of assuring external
donors and benefactors such as the British government which is ploughing a
large amount of its resources to help make the country viable again, that the
majority of citizens are solidly united behind their government in support of
every policy and project that is put forward in their name.
Background
This is not the first time that Focus
has made this kind of call. In 1996 when the issue of elections was being
discussed as a way of getting the NPRC military government out of power, we put
this idea forward as a way of avoiding divisions in our society, which, we
argued then, would be the inevitable consequence of electoral competition in
the midst of civil strife.
There is no doubt that President Kabbah has
done a lot for peace in Sierra Leone and has, at times to the irritation of
Sierra Leoneans including some of his own cabinet colleagues and political
advisers, leant over backwards to accommodate peace initiatives involving the
RUF. But he has lacked the drive to see his decisions through, allowing others
to dictate the pace of developments afterwards.
So while there is universal acceptance that
the present troubles were not caused by President Kabbah and the SLPP
government, there is unanimity in the belief that the government has run out of
ideas, and that its lack of innovation in policy making and/or implementation
has often made matters far worse. This is largely because they have denied
themselves full access to the pool of able and patriotic Sierra Leoneans who,
because they do not belong to their party or their social network, are treated
at best as irrelevant to the process of government and at worse, enemies or
rebel collaborators.
Looking at all
the odds facing this country and in light of the present government's failure
to define the challenges that lie ahead and to prepare Sierra Leoneans to face
them as a united country, the time has come for radical action.
The positive way forward, we suggest, is the
immediate creation of an Interim Administration for National Unity (IANU), to
bring together all of the human resources needed to make the task of recovery
and progress easier.
The need for
new national core values
Sierra Leone
has reached a critical phase in its history. Therefore it must, as a matter of
priority, urgently, drastically redefine its national core values.
We must distinguish between values that
characterise us as Sierra Leoneans, i.e. national values, because we all share
a common heritage irrespective of which political party or government is in
power, or the ethnic and regional origin of our citizens, and values that
change from time to time, which bring out the worst in ourselves and sometimes
create divisions.
Further, a distinction ought to be made
between the government of the country, which can change as often as need be,
and the State of Sierra Leone whose core values do not change but should in
reality always condition any government of the day. It is the blurring of these
differences that has created problems for us in the past and more recently.
Some people in the present government, and
no doubt those in the RUF who have set their eyes on grabbing power by force,
believe that when once they are in government, they become equal to the State
itself and so can behave in any way they choose. We then end up with serious
problems, such as unaccountability, the absence of consultation with those who
are directly affected by their decisions and actions, the lack of transparency
in official transactions, and the avoidance of ownership of responsibility for
the myriad of problems created by successive rulers.
Unpopular and
unrepresentative
Governments
are transient phenomena. They come and go like the seasons of the year and so
cannot, therefore, become the yardsticks by which national consciousness should
be identified or measured. But the State remains the State for all times. The
values of the State cannot, indeed should never, be changed merely at the whim
and pleasure of the government. If anything, they should govern the behaviour
of the government itself. The habitual reversal of this role is a major cause
of our continuing political predicament and the frequent occasions of abuse of
power.
When we wrote in August last year that this
was a cabinet of deadwood, we were not making a joke or frivolous comment about
the ability of the present cabinet to run the country. We really meant that it
could not deliver the aspirations of the majority of Sierra Leoneans. We
arrived at that judgement once we had looked at the background of some the
government's leading players and appointees, their antecedents and past
performance as decision/non-decision-makers. Time has proved that they were not
just dead wood but they have since become complete and unmistakable lame ducks.
Yet they continue to delude themselves that they are in control.
We know from our limited contacts that there
is a real fear that the present government lacks the ability to deliver on any
of the critical civic programmes that will be necessary to harness the
opportunities that will soon come Sierra Leone's way if and when the violence
has been contained or, as one sincerely hopes, brought to a complete end. This
is the conundrum currently faced by the international community; not least
those key states, like Britain, that have literally jumped into the fray to
help sort especially our security problems.
The question that they are bound to ask is
whether Sierra Leoneans are ready to face the new challenges that would be
thrust on them, following this tragic horror story of their nation, once the
fighting is finally over? Is there going to be a relapse into the same
internecine squabbles simply because we start off on the very first day by
running the country badly as before? The fear of these countries, Britain and
the UN in particular, must be that after all their efforts and the resources
they have committed so far, if the government of the country is slow and not
sufficiently imaginative to deal with those opportunities that will be created,
things will again deteriorate as they have before; and worse, the situation
could lead to a breakdown in relationships between the citizens themselves,
never mind that between them and the rebels!
It is no exaggeration to say that the
Government of Sierra Leone is unpopular among the masses and that it is only
the civil war that has helped to maintain a semblance of cohesion between
government and the governed. However the government's unpopularity is its own
making because for quite sometime it has become inaccessible, having literally
closeted itself beyond the reach of the masses. Yet the government could have
used basic tactics to head off popular opposition, cynicism and anger by, for
example, advancing the much-trumpeted "democratic" colours of Kabbah
(which has effectively served as the springboard for launching British military/humanitarian
intervention) to appeal for calm, order and time to implement its program.
The snags with this are that firstly, the
government has no exciting programs to offer or implement! Secondly, the President
and his key ministers have been nowhere to be seen or heard at the critical
times when things were on a knife edge, when people needed to be reassured or
things needed to be explained about what was happening in the country.
The ruling SLPP government has more or less
succeeded in upholding the framework of the corrupt system bequeathed to the
country by its predecessors – the APC and the NPRC. If anything, it has been
revealed as representing the vested interests of the country's small group of
opportunistic politicians of a past era, who are supported by a small core of
corrupt and ruthless youngish thugs masquerading as technocrats. They have
cleverly parcelled out ministries to their supporters, forgetting that there is
out there a mass of Sierra Leoneans who do not belong to their party nor share
their own philosophy. Consequently it has failed to meet even the most basic
social needs and democratic aspirations of the vast majority of ordinary Sierra
Leoneans, such as their concerns about personal safety and national security.
Most people feel that the government is only a government in name.
As for this ritualistic nonsense of being
the democratically elected government, the least said the better. In any case,
most of the cabinet ministers were not elected or democratically appointed!
Careful examination of the ministerial line-up reveals precisely the opposite:
that behind the façade of democracy, the present government is unaccountable at
the best of times and has not been transparent in most of its transactions.
Corruption continues even at a time when the country is enjoying the full
attention of the world media. Besides, it is others who are taking the vital
decisions for Sierra Leone, sometimes from outside the country.
This
state of affairs should not be allowed to continue. It is time for Sierra
Leoneans to take full control over their own affairs. We need change, and a
radical one immediately. The present Cabinet must go – to give way to a new set
of people who can concentrate solely on the specific agenda of steadying our
ship of State and injecting a new realism into the thinking and the conduct of
government.
National unity
is the key
Under the
dispensation that Focus advocates, the
overarching emphasis should be on national unity and solidarity.
Can President Kabbah's government deliver
this? No! Why? Because he leads a
political party whose loyalty is naturally, understandably, first and foremost
to its supporters. But since those supporters constitute a small majority in
relation to the rest of the population who do not belong to it, it means that a
large proportion of citizens is not represented within government. Even if they
had an overwhelming majority on their side, the SLPP must accept that democracy
is not just the rule of the majority but that it is also the power of the
majority to look after the interest and welfare of the minority in society. We
have witnessed blatant nepotistic appointments, with the allocation of ministries
and government appointments not on merit but on extraneous loyalties that have
largely been bought (we can name you a few ambassadorial appointments of this
type!) or, in the rarest of cases, earned.
Focus on Sierra Leone has
consistently stressed on national unity to confront the future. Our concern
undoubtedly is a reflection of our awareness that divisions, and in particular
ethnic divisions, exist politically and socially. In recent times these
divisions have been exacerbated to the point of bursting into the open, by
self-serving interpretations of who is to blame for the war and whether or not
bad governance in this country begot the disgruntled men and women of the RUF
and the AFRC who have used their grievances to unleash a most vicious war on
the country.
It is
crucial for now that the country is run without the added burden of a divided
and polarised society. Only an interim administration of national unity – by
its very mission to serve the national interest and composed of personalities
who are trusted and respected across the entire nation - can avoid such
pitfalls.
Party
pressures frustrate the will of the President
Many people
see the present government as part of the problem for Sierra Leone. It has
taken many terrible decisions and made just as many serious errors of judgement
that have led to horrendous consequences, including the death of thousands of
innocent civilians; yet the very people who are responsible for these decisions
have either kept their jobs or are still prominently associated with the
workings of the government. It is disgraceful!
Here again internal party wrangling in the
SLPP has been undermining the effectiveness of President Kabbah who will not
act against these wreckers. But credit has to be given when earned and we must
give it to Kabbah for once, publicly, telling the party that he is the
President of all Sierra Leoneans.
In a letter to the party in August 1998,
Kabbah who was being pilloried from all sides of the SLPP, was forced to react
uncharacteristically robustly: "My
own task" he wrote "is to
improve the country for all Sierra Leoneans without forgetting to help the
Party, to give you support, to give you encouragement. My role complements
yours, for the development of our beloved Sierra Leone. Please allow me to
concentrate on my main role. I am sure you are fully capable of fulfilling your
own role, for which you will always get my support. And I am sure you will also
help me to fulfil mine."
The letter continued: "My role here, as I plainly see it, is to recruit all men and
women with meaningful contributions to make, and for all of them to join us in
this national emergency. And in this context, I see myself as encouraging these
helpers to help the nation." This was fine fighting talk but it all
came to nought because he failed to show his resolve in his actions and
subsequent appointments. He kept the wreckers in and brought more opportunists
on board, including the "debris of failures of past years". (See
Focus Vol 5 No 7.)
Sierra Leone, as Kabbah so rightly
recognised, belongs to all of us. No one should be discriminated against or be
made to feel unwelcome. We have enough problems dealing with a common enemy,
i.e. the RUF and those others who want to reduce the country to rubble and
ruin; so we cannot afford to expend our energies fighting among ourselves for
what is left over by them.
In reality therefore, Focus is offering President Kabbah an honourable way out of his
bondage by suggesting the alternative of an interim government. We know that he
has been held hostage and undermined by sections of his own party and possibly
others outside it. He can now boldly tell them where to get off because he will
have the support of not only the sensible members of that Party (which once included
this editor), but other Sierra Leoneans who do not belong to it or any other
party, who simply want to do the best for Sierra Leone in the present
circumstances.
We
have reached a critical stage in the country's struggle for survival. It is no
longer a party political issue. We went passed that stage a long time ago.
We have the
people it takes …So let's use them
Focus believes that Sierra Leone has the
men and women with the calibre, energy and zest to steer this sinking ship of
ours into much calmer waters, and to lay the new foundations for the prosperity
that is yet to come.
We need people who can instil confidence in
the viability of our country's statehood and make us believe that we can stand
on our own feet once again. We need somebody or group of people who can attract
the broadest spectrum of support across the political, social and economic
divide in the country. Above all we need strong men and women of proven
character who are fearless in taking decisions honestly and with conviction,
and are prepared to defend their actions and face the consequences. We want
people who can instil in our gun-toting generation the confidence that if and
when they lay down their weapons they stand to gain a better future for
themselves. Above all we want those who can give real hope to the youth and the
disadvantaged in Sierra Leone.
It is important that somebody strong and
decisive leads this new arrangement. It is possible that once we assemble them
together, they can meet in plenary session and agree among themselves on who
shall lead them. But if President Kabbah really likes, and since he is the one
that some of our key protagonists like Britain seem to favour (to our national
detriment so far!) he can stay as President. In that case we must not let him
continue to make decisions on our behalf, which lead us inexorably to our own
suicides. Thus we might need to suspend that section of our Constitution that
gives him extensive executive powers, remembering always that the Constitution
is a living document that is meant to serve the people and not the other way
round!
We would like to suggest names but the
danger is that in present day Sierra Leone virtually every name becomes a
target for personal abuse and denigration. But we have to dissociate
personal/private antipathies from an individual's suitability and ability to
perform a job. That is one key reason why the country accepted Tejan Kabbah and
his ministers in the first place. But they have failed to deliver results. That
is why Focus will continue to argue
that they now give way and let others make their contribution.
Frivolous
objections
There have
already been spurious objections by some SLPP supporters to the idea of an
interim arrangement to oversee the next phase of Sierra Leone's liberation.
They say, not unreasonably, that they were elected in February 1996 to serve
for four years and are even claiming that they should be allowed to serve till
2002 to make up for the periods of interruption during their rule, by the AFRC
coup in 1997 and the rebel invasion of 1999.
This argument is, to say the least, most
unhelpful. Surely if the present government were performing well the question
of its continuation in office would not become an issue. But the fact is they have
not performed. Even the SLPP members have been openly critical of the
government and gunning for Kabbah for his lack of results as they see it. NO!
As far as Focus is concerned, the
SLPP has less than eight or so months to go before it faces a general election.
Surely in the interest of peace and national unity it can forgo that period to
ensure that we have in place an administration that engages the respect of
everyone across the political spectrum and, most important of all, enjoys the
popular support across the length and breadth of this country.
The question thus
arises, how do we arrive at this decision if the need for it has been accepted?
We
are bound to encounter serious problems here. For a start, the decision
unfortunately cannot simply be left to civil society. Focus remains a strong advocate of the role of civil society.
However, as one now sees things from abroad, civil society in Sierra Leone has
itself been compromised and hi-jacked, and turned into a vehicle for peddling
the personal ambitions of a few well placed individuals. As a result it has not
been able to put the requisite pressure on the Kabbah government for reform.
Also, for civil society to be effective
there has to be security. It is only in a peaceful and secure environment that
people are able to move around freely, and to express their views. It is only
when people feel free and secure that they can fully participate in the
governance of their country. That has not been the case for a long while. In
the absence of such a pressure group, faced with a non performing government,
the only possible alternative is for a carefully selected set of patriotic
people with integrity and drive, to be at the helm of the country's affairs
until such a time that we can revert to multiparty politics and electoral
competition.
Focus is
under no illusion that this will be a tough idea to sell. There are those who
are stuck like leeches to the hem of Kabbah's presidential robes and know that
once he goes they too go with him. They are doing everything possible to block
out all progressive views on the way forward for Sierra Leone.
Fortunately, the country has ample
experience for making this kind of choice. The Bintumani Conferences of 1995/96
have been milestones in representative mass action in Sierra Leone. There is no
reason why a decision about an interim administration for national unity (IANU)
to oversee the country's affairs until real peace has been attained, cannot be
canvassed or argued, and decided there. Bintumani II effectively signed the
death warrant for NPRC military rule. So the precedent is there for such
debated decision-making.
A
National Consultative Council, with cross sectional representation from all
walks of life, can afford us the ideal forum for the creation of IANU.
We invite the UN, Britain (if they do not
want their good work to be in vain) and all other interested parties to put
pressure on President Kabbah, and to use their good offices to facilitate the
holding of such a conference even now, while the fighting still goes on. Sierra
Leone cannot wait a day longer to embark on laying the foundations for its new
structures for the future.
The Agenda
The sense of
outrage felt by Sierra Leoneans following Foday Sankoh's and the RUF’s failure to
comply with the peace accord does not excuse our government for failing even
now to come up with a comprehensive plan that would serve as a framework for
any eventuality following this latest setback.
For example, as late as today, it seems to
us the only policy declaration by our Government, and citizens of Freetown who
take their cue from it is "The British must stay". So what happens in
the meantime? Do we sit and fold our arms until the war has been won against
the rebels? If as a result of the Foreign Secretary Mr Robin Cook saying that
his government will go all the way with the Kabbah Government the British do in
fact stay, what complementary plans have been made to reinforce this presence?
So the British stay and they give us
protection and raise a new army. What would we then be doing that would benefit
everyone within the safe haven that has been created by the British?
1.
The agenda for an interim administration must be precise
and time limited.
2.
It must make security of the state and of the individual
its main concern. Therefore it must be at the forefront of all attempts to get
a final resolution of the conflict, whether by the use of force, which we
believe may not be the answer, or by negotiation and dialogue to which we will
continue to advise that doors should not be closed. The important thing is that
the interim administration should be seen to be in charge and taking the key
decisions that matter. What it must not do is leave it to others, however well
meaning they are in giving us their help and support.
3.
It must develop a national project plan new institutional
mechanisms that can accommodate the needs and demands of the broad range of
social forces that exist throughout the country, especially the youth of Sierra
Leone; and a timetable for implementation.
4.
It must be an administration that will be seen as
actively representing:
refugees living in the overpopulated
camps, inside or outside the country's borders;
those separated from loved ones since
the start of the war, internally and externally;
those who have lost the freedom to
speak and organise even in their own country;
the many manipulated children who are
forced to kill or be killed;
the vast numbers of physically maimed, psychologically damaged and
the destitute;
all Sierra Leoneans disenfranchised by
the war; and,
the rest of the population of
whichever political persuasion.
5.
It must invite input from all Sierra Leoneans, at home
and in the Diaspora.
6.
It must proactively go after, and cultivate, the support of
the majority and the widespread plurality of Sierra Leoneans.
7.
It must actively promote national reconciliation, in the
sense as we understand it, namely as a healing of conflict in a thorough and
complete sense, in an atmosphere of truthfulness and tolerance, wherein
divergent views are permitted, and the powerless are genuinely given a chance
to become part of the process.
One ought to point out that sometimes when
people talk about national reconciliation they forget, probably are not aware,
that it cannot be achieved through military means. Reconciliation is possible
only through political means, and even then only when the majority of people of
various political and ethnic persuasions accept it. For this to happen, leaders
of the various communities including from authoritative bodies of the country
and from all political parties should meet regularly and discuss the country's
affairs. Only then will some consensus emerge about how to move the country
forward.
8.
Eventually set an election date, taking into
consideration the state of preparedness of the country in terms of:
cessation of all hostilities
disarmament
accessibility of all areas of the
country
Freedom of movement and travel
reconstruction of electoral boundaries
recreation of an national electoral
register
Conclusion
In conclusion, ultimately Sierra Leoneans will gradually come to recognise that
the government's capacity to act in a politically coherent, socially responsive
and, above all, democratically accountable and legitimate way will be augmented
only when participation is broad based. We need therefore a more democratic
process of integration. This not just an ephemeral political demand, but it is
the premise for those of us who are seeking to change the present system of
government by means of introducing openness, transparency and accountability at
every level, coupled with the fullest participation of the greatest number of
our citizens.
ear Editor of
Focus
I welcome your
call for an Interim Arrangement for National Unity (IANU). Like you I agree
that we cannot seriously address a national emergency such as ours when we
cannot even hear ourselves think above the rising cacophony of competing
political elite and the eerie silence of a government bereft of solutions to
our problems or the ability to lead us anywhere.
Let AH-YA-NU (IANU) be a rallying cry for
change, reflection, renewal, redirection, and a fresh start. IANU's priority is
nothing short of 'State Formation'. Yes, that’s right, state formation! We do
not have a 'state' today. Whether it collapsed or ever existed in the first
place, is for finer minds than mine to consider. Our task right now is to start
the slow, painful process of state formation. This is the context within which
I believe we should consider your very well argued concept of the IANU.
Issues
for consideration
The composition of the IANU will be of
central importance. It must reflect the balance of forces in Sierra Leone
today; without such a composition, we doom ourselves to a continued period of chronic
instability. Pragmatically speaking, those who are excluded cannot be so
powerful as to render the IANU completely useless before it is even
established. We would then have an interim arrangement as paralysed as the
current government appears to be. But the IANU should not, and need not, be so
inclusive as to incorporate those who are so clearly beyond the pale. A reconstituted RUF that is signatory to a
new peace deal should be part of such an arrangement. OK, so Lomé is flawed.
Then let’s learn what lessons we need to learn, fix it and move on. But let us
not imagine that we can or should throw out the baby with the bath water, dirty
though that is. The reports coming in from Sierra Leone tell the sad story of
fragile pro-government alliances that are unlikely to be able to prosecute a
war to a “logical conclusion” (as the eager warmongers advocate). Other reports
we are getting, on the other hand, point to the importance of trust-building so
that combatants – many barely in their teens ‑ can give up their
increasingly pointless fight without fear of violent retribution.
IANU is not an appeasement to the RUF,
AFRC or rebellious SLA soldiers, and we must not be deflected from pursuing the
idea simply because the accusation is levied against us by those who feel
threatened by it. It must also include the forces (now) opposed to the RUF that
were excluded from Lome. The Sierra Leonean political scientist, Dr Yusuf
Bangura, has told us about the “multi-ethnic bipolar” realities of Sierra
Leone’s politics. In essence I interpret this to mean that elite groups between
both the Mende and Temne tribes jockey for power and are able to mobilise
enough forces within their respective ranks to upset the entire apple cart if
they don’t like what is happening. Meanwhile, members from the multitude of
smaller tribal and other civil society groups align themselves with these two
dominant groups in ways that they feel best serve their interests. After all,
whether the two elephants dance or wrestle, it is always the grass that gets
flattened. The implications for the IANU are that we need both northern and
southern interests to be well represented within the structure.
Political stability without wealth
creation and technocratic capacity will not get us very far. That is why the
IANU must pay close attention to the interests of Sierra Leone’s tiny and
shrinking middle class. Among these dwindling ranks will be found the
professionals to manage key tasks, treat the sick, build and manage the
infrastructure, and so on. Moreover, some (sadly too few) within these ranks
are also business people, again vital for any period of serious renewal.
However, let us not forget other significant business players such as the Fula
traders and business people who in recent years have played increasingly
significant roles in commercial life of the country. But we must dispense with
the ridiculous ideas whereby people are elected to head institutions such as
the chamber of commerce, or their copycat replicas overseas, who have neither proven
business acumen nor experience of running successful businesses. Just because a
man has one or two houses in London does not qualify them to head a chamber of
commerce. Populist pretensions should not become substitutes for productive
input into the operations of these institutions.
Last but far from least, indeed most
important in my view, the IANU must make space for the voiceless, poor,
excluded, and disenfranchised majority in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s crisis
is, in part, a youth crisis. Sure it is also about diamonds and external
interference, about the failure of state formation, about globalisation, etc,
etc. But let us not forget the youth at the heart of this matter. Young people
– those in the bush and those not bearing any arms – must have absolute
confidence that the IANU will not just represent but also actually serve their
interests. We must be careful in this context to ensure that the interests of
urban and rural dwellers – i.e. Freetown AND the rest of Sierra Leone – are
served by this interim arrangement. If young people in large numbers have no
stake in the IANU it will be doomed to fail and we will fail to break the
cyclical nature of our current crisis. We will be here again before too long.
The young
people of Sierra Leone have a strong moral claim to be part of an IANU. But the
real thrust of my argument is that these are political actors whose actions,
whether or not they are gun-toting and high on cocaine, have considerable
political consequences for the rest of us. We ignore or marginalise them at our
peril.
Although this is not the place to pursue the
argument in detail, I suspect that our left-wing intellectuals have missed the
point somewhat on this. They have looked for classical revolutionary behaviour
or even potential among the ranks of the RUF, found none and dismissed them as
“lumpen”. A mistake! We are only now beginning to understand the changing
nature of social action taken by the dispossessed. We should not equate
micro-political action with pre-political inaction.
Process and product
What I am
drawing attention to here, Sir, is the importance of process and product. No
longer can we sit back while the eloque
