The publication on June 6, on our website, of proposals for an Interim Administration for National Unity (IANU) for Sierra Leone (see page 3) generated considerable public interest and favourable reactions. At about the same time in Freetown, a conference of national organisations and civic leaders was held, which again reached conclusions similar to those that we had made. It, too, enthusiastically called for an interim government. But instead of looking at this idea purely from a patriotic standpoint, some selfish power-drunk politicians in the Kabbah administration began, and even now continue, to trivialise it by threatening 'treason charges' against those who support or suggest it. We dare them! This special edition of Focus is in open defiance to their stupid threats. We challenge President Kabbah and his Government to declare their stand on the crucial issue of whether every Sierra Leonean citizen is entitled to a fundamental democratic right to express and to hold a political opinion, including that about the present and future governance of our country! Let's see the true nature of their acclaimed so-called democratic colours on display.

FSL VOL 5 No 3

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or Focus, pursuing the military option as a final solution for the civil war in Sierra Leone is a dead-end and, in our view, not attainable. Current evidence and past experience in both our country and other parts of the world, point to that conclusion as inevitable.

As a nation that is ravaged by warfare, we need to re- examine our consciences and seek answers to some lingering questions: How come after all our previous expeditions - Ecomog, UN, British/Westside saga, etc., we are still so far away from establishing a peaceful and normal Sierra Leone? How is it that the RUF and their allies still have the stomach to meet and survive our very best efforts?

Partly in defiance of the overwhelming military threats around them and partly in opposition, and possibly due, to the starkly timid and irresolute political edifice that masquerades as a government in Freetown, RUF and allied forces have shown a willingness to fight to the death and carry with them the hapless civilians who live in their areas of operation. Thus without negotiation and a peaceful end to fighting, these areas will only be taken with the loss of not just rebel lives (which will no doubt satisfy some, possibly most Sierra Leoneans!) but also innocent civilians who have been caught behind rebel lines. It is not right that those who have become victims, through no fault of their own, should also be made to pay with their lives simply in order to make the rest of us feel at ease.

Presently, the reality is that there is yet no (existing) peace in Sierra Leone to enforce or to keep. This probably begs the question, what is the role of the UN? But there is still peace to be made …and had, which must be created from scratch. It cannot be created by force. Although the use of force can potentially help to reclaim the vast swathes of territory currently held by the RUF and its allies, it will do nothing to blunt, or win, the minds and hearts of those who are dealing such terrible body blows to Sierra Leone's nationhood and very existence. Moreover, we will have to live with these people afterwards.

New thinking needs to be done. More effort should be committed to the search for peace than before, through new and transparent political initiatives that are just as fully resourced as the ongoing preparations for warfare. The following pages of this edition put forward the case for an interim government in order to help the country focus its energy and resources on broadly based objectives for peace and unity.

Peace creation requires us to seek to transform the conflict objectively - through explaining and understanding its origins, the fact that it so readily spread out to most parts of the country and refuses to go away, and the consequences that it has wrought for everyone. This must be done without the emotionalism and the (sometimes) deliberate obfuscation of the last ten years.

If, as was often claimed, RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh was the main obstacle to peace, why is it that now that he is at least for the moment out of the way, it has not been possible to go all out and broker a new peace deal with everyone else, even if new political concessions have to be made?

What is so repugnant about having a peace 'deal' in Sierra Leone when virtually every current and past conflict in the world has been attended by deals of every description? Take for examples: Northern Ireland where known bombers and killers were freed from jail to facilitate an end to the 40 years of terror in that country; the current Israeli-Palestinian flare-up which is bringing all kinds of closet peace makers out of the woodwork; the glaring absence of disapproval by the international community which turned a blind eye and, therefore, implicitly encouraged Libyan Colonel Mu'amar Quadafi's payment of ransom (or as some people charged, 'blood') money' to Philippino rebels for the release of European hostages; then again, some European /NATO leaders only this October were even prepared, for the sake of peace and democracy in former Yugoslavia, to let the former Serbian leader President Milosevic go to a safe haven if he would concede to the 'democratic' wish of his country’s electorate.

Sierra Leone too needs a deal, but not a sell-out. The Lomé Agreement tried to do just that, but it was weak in that it did not include all parties in the conflict. It was not appeasement, as was alleged. The violence had to be controlled and eventually brought to an end. At least under Lomé the rebels were going to be made accountable with the task of controlling the excesses of their fighters, which Sierra Leoneans were could not make them do except upon outright military victory. But Lomé was derailed, in part, by meddlesome individuals and institutions. Undeniably, there has to be a trade-off for ending the fighting.

There was a time when Sam 'Mosquito' Bockarie was the problem and, deservedly, everybody's hate figure. Then he was removed from the scene, not by the bellicose posturing of our over-inflated military egos but by the RUF itself and the very people to whom he was a hero.

Lt Col Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC also flirted with the RUF for a while but see, now, what a proactive disciple for peace in Sierra Leone he has become! He is doing so, despite the personal tragedy of the brutal, barbaric and totally unjust execution of his elder brother and twenty-three other military officers in October 1998, by a vengeful and uncompassionate President Kabbah and his government. People talk about training a new army but never mention the fact that the cream of the country's skilled and experienced officers was wiped out in that mad fit of revenge. Koroma for his part is even now being buffeted on all sides by whispering accusations of betrayal from some of the men he commanded, including surviving members of the group that staged the coup against Kabbah in May 1997 who released him from jail to lead them. His crime is that he has opted, wisely in our view, to work for peace with and for the very man (Kabbah) who, they charge, destroyed the lives of their colleagues. Koroma's courage should be applauded and rewarded by him being brought more prominently into a renewed and more focused quest for peace.

We must also mention the thousands of civil servants who were, and still are being, victimised by the unjust and vengeful acts of the restored Kabbah government which, upon its return, selfishly and recklessly embarked on a witch hunt against those who, in legitimate exercise of their personal freedom of choice, had not found it sensible, possible, or even necessary to join the fugitive government on its flight to Guinea following the May 1997 coup. We should approach and win them over despite all that has happened before. If need be we must cajole, entice and allure them – in fact do whatever it takes our human ingenuity – to bring all of these people on board the peace process.

It is not easy to make peace. It will be a protracted process. That is why, we presume, there is impatience among Sierra Leoneans who see nothing else but the use of force as their only recourse. Many have suffered in this war and most of them are direct victims of it. But we must continue to prevail on them and their inner reserves of goodwill, to engage in a new peace process for genuine reconciliation. We must educate them, and ourselves too, because it will be both a learning process and an experiment in human relations for everybody.

Those who now see British ‘re-colonisation’ as the answer to their problems are shortsighted and selfish. They only live for now and have no stake in the future. But they must remember that Sierra Leone's independence is not up for grabs. It is a legacy bequeathed to us, which was fought with the sweat and tears of a previous generation, some of whom are still around. It is therefore not for them to relinquish it. We foresee that, come the day when there is realisation of the lack of control over their own country (and resources), the present youth of Sierra Leone who have been effectively deprived of a decent and peaceful childhood, will spare no effort to reassert their nationhood in a manner reminiscent of the earlier struggles of their forefathers for independence. Happily, the British have vigorously denied any suggestion of re-colonisation. There is absolutely no reason to doubt that the present British government’s intention and determination is solely to help Sierra Leone attain peace.

So, by all means, let the international community continue to take keen, active and supportive interest in Sierra Leone as they have done before. But let them also encourage the Sierra Leonean people themselves to come to a homegrown solution of their divisions, of which this war is a tragic consequence. It must be a solution that draws upon our traditional methods of conflict resolution, deriving from the society and the communities whence the rebels originally came. This is the pragmatic approach to peace in which we expect the government of the day to take the lead. On the contrary, they seem keener to do only the things that ensure their permanent grip on power.

Nowadays, the Kabbah government is more interested in taking over the mines than anything else. The British seem to agree with this and seem to be working zealously to this agenda. What if that too fails? And since no one wants to address this question, we must assume that failure is not contemplated. So then they take the mines. What next? Whose interest will the mines serve? How would the expedition itself be paid for, now or in future? No doubt, with the proceeds from exploiting the mines! But how much of that will then be left for the citizens of Sierra Leone and for rebuilding their country and economy?

The fact that everyone wants victory explains why, during the last three months of the rainy season when there has been a dramatic lull in the fighting and the incidence of mutilations and amputations greatly reduced, no serious sustained effort has been made to come up with new political initiatives. No one, but for the brave efforts of the struggling Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, has been minded enough to capitalise on this brief respite from violence to instigate dialogue and break the political (never mind, the military) impasse. Instead more resources and effort, including manpower, have been put into the reinforcement of battle lines. Now there is fresh panic as word spreads around about a growing deficit in the ground strength of the UN force, with Indian and Jordanian troops reportedly calling it a day. This has added more pressure on the British to make their presence not only more visible but also permanent and in greater numbers. The expectation is that “they should go in and finish the rebels”. If only that were possible!

We can’t keep on expecting others to do things for us when we do not show sufficient care, concern and appreciation for our own predicament. Any observing stranger to Sierra Leone very quickly comes to the conclusion that the real problem of our civil war lies within and between Sierra Leoneans themselves. We do not like each other.

Focus again affirms that violence never pays and only, always, serves as a temporary cure. The attendant causes of civil strife remain intact and soon reinvigorate and reinvent themselves once the dust of civil war settles down. Among the present authorities in Sierra Leone, there is a lack of new initiatives to motivate the population into the direction of peace and reconciliation. It is a lethargy that is aided in large measure by a miasma of incoherent and knee-jerk policies that point more towards fire fighting than a long-term strategy to forestall the resurgence of violence in the future.

After years of stumbling, fumbling and drift, it's time for …

AN INTERIM ADMINISTRATION FOR NATIONAL UNITY

(This article was first published on Focus on Sierra Leone's website on 9/6/00 [ http://www.focus-on-sierra-leone.co.uk])

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et us assume that the RUF is beaten into the dust once and for all, as a result of the concerted effort of the International Community led by the UN, with the very active and public support of Great Britain. When this putative result is handed down to the present Government of Sierra Leone, what might it do to harness the precious opportunity thus presented to it? What plans has it in store right now, which it will activate to enable it to seize this window of opportunity to advance the cause of this long suffering nation? As far as we can see, none!

Interim Administration for National Unity (IANU)

President Tejan Kabbah must be persuaded that he has done his best but it is not enough, and the time has come for his government to move aside to make way for new minds, so that Sierra Leone's problems can be looked at with fresh insight. What the country needs is a new interim administration to take charge of its affairs while others are trying to bring the violence to an end in one way or other. The present government appears to be afflicted by tunnel vision and does not seem able to see the country's problems from the wider perspective.

As a matter of extreme urgency, Focus on Sierra Leone calls for the immediate creation of an Interim Administration of National Unity (IANU) for a period of at least four years.

During the period of this interim government that we propose, we strongly suggest that all partisan political activities should be put on hold. In their place there ought to be:

a national consensus-driven process of stock-taking;

a redefinition and prioritisation of key national objectives;

the development of schemes to satisfy the most basic needs of the people;

the inauguration of an on-going process of formal national soul-searching; and

the initiation of a mandatory regime of regular consultation with the masses.

There has been no leadership in any of these directions.

Priority areas of policy for the next four years should be clearly identified so that no one is left in doubt about what the national agenda and goals are, for the whole and not just part of the country or sections of its population.

Our call for an interim administration comes after sounding opinions inside Sierra Leone, and here among Diaspora in the United Kingdom, Europe and the United States. Admittedly, these soundings have been limited in scope but even they point inexorably to a desperate call for change and the involvement of Sierra Leone's best talents in the phase of rebuilding the country. There is a sense of confusion, exasperation and frustration over the lack of activity by the present cabinet to come up with new ideas to demonstrate their sense of urgency, realism and commitment to fundamentally reversing the parlous state of affairs in Sierra Leone.

The interim arrangement that we are advocating will have the singular virtue of assuring external donors and benefactors such as the British government which is ploughing a large amount of its resources to help make the country viable again, that the majority of citizens are solidly united behind their government in support of every policy and project that is put forward in their name.

Background
This is not the first time that Focus has made this kind of call. In 1996 when the issue of elections was being discussed as a way of getting the NPRC military government out of power, we put this idea forward as a way of avoiding divisions in our society, which, we argued then, would be the inevitable consequence of electoral competition in the midst of civil strife.

There is no doubt that President Kabbah has done a lot for peace in Sierra Leone and has, at times to the irritation of Sierra Leoneans including some of his own cabinet colleagues and political advisers, leant over backwards to accommodate peace initiatives involving the RUF. But he has lacked the drive to see his decisions through, allowing others to dictate the pace of developments afterwards.

So while there is universal acceptance that the present troubles were not caused by President Kabbah and the SLPP government, there is unanimity in the belief that the government has run out of ideas, and that its lack of innovation in policy making and/or implementation has often made matters far worse. This is largely because they have denied themselves full access to the pool of able and patriotic Sierra Leoneans who, because they do not belong to their party or their social network, are treated at best as irrelevant to the process of government and at worse, enemies or rebel collaborators.

Looking at all the odds facing this country and in light of the present government's failure to define the challenges that lie ahead and to prepare Sierra Leoneans to face them as a united country, the time has come for radical action.

The positive way forward, we suggest, is the immediate creation of an Interim Administration for National Unity (IANU), to bring together all of the human resources needed to make the task of recovery and progress easier.

The need for new national core values

Sierra Leone has reached a critical phase in its history. Therefore it must, as a matter of priority, urgently, drastically redefine its national core values.

We must distinguish between values that characterise us as Sierra Leoneans, i.e. national values, because we all share a common heritage irrespective of which political party or government is in power, or the ethnic and regional origin of our citizens, and values that change from time to time, which bring out the worst in ourselves and sometimes create divisions.

Further, a distinction ought to be made between the government of the country, which can change as often as need be, and the State of Sierra Leone whose core values do not change but should in reality always condition any government of the day. It is the blurring of these differences that has created problems for us in the past and more recently.

Some people in the present government, and no doubt those in the RUF who have set their eyes on grabbing power by force, believe that when once they are in government, they become equal to the State itself and so can behave in any way they choose. We then end up with serious problems, such as unaccountability, the absence of consultation with those who are directly affected by their decisions and actions, the lack of transparency in official transactions, and the avoidance of ownership of responsibility for the myriad of problems created by successive rulers.

Unpopular and unrepresentative

Governments are transient phenomena. They come and go like the seasons of the year and so cannot, therefore, become the yardsticks by which national consciousness should be identified or measured. But the State remains the State for all times. The values of the State cannot, indeed should never, be changed merely at the whim and pleasure of the government. If anything, they should govern the behaviour of the government itself. The habitual reversal of this role is a major cause of our continuing political predicament and the frequent occasions of abuse of power.

When we wrote in August last year that this was a cabinet of deadwood, we were not making a joke or frivolous comment about the ability of the present cabinet to run the country. We really meant that it could not deliver the aspirations of the majority of Sierra Leoneans. We arrived at that judgement once we had looked at the background of some the government's leading players and appointees, their antecedents and past performance as decision/non-decision-makers. Time has proved that they were not just dead wood but they have since become complete and unmistakable lame ducks. Yet they continue to delude themselves that they are in control.

We know from our limited contacts that there is a real fear that the present government lacks the ability to deliver on any of the critical civic programmes that will be necessary to harness the opportunities that will soon come Sierra Leone's way if and when the violence has been contained or, as one sincerely hopes, brought to a complete end. This is the conundrum currently faced by the international community; not least those key states, like Britain, that have literally jumped into the fray to help sort especially our security problems.

The question that they are bound to ask is whether Sierra Leoneans are ready to face the new challenges that would be thrust on them, following this tragic horror story of their nation, once the fighting is finally over? Is there going to be a relapse into the same internecine squabbles simply because we start off on the very first day by running the country badly as before? The fear of these countries, Britain and the UN in particular, must be that after all their efforts and the resources they have committed so far, if the government of the country is slow and not sufficiently imaginative to deal with those opportunities that will be created, things will again deteriorate as they have before; and worse, the situation could lead to a breakdown in relationships between the citizens themselves, never mind that between them and the rebels!

It is no exaggeration to say that the Government of Sierra Leone is unpopular among the masses and that it is only the civil war that has helped to maintain a semblance of cohesion between government and the governed. However the government's unpopularity is its own making because for quite sometime it has become inaccessible, having literally closeted itself beyond the reach of the masses. Yet the government could have used basic tactics to head off popular opposition, cynicism and anger by, for example, advancing the much-trumpeted "democratic" colours of Kabbah (which has effectively served as the springboard for launching British military/humanitarian intervention) to appeal for calm, order and time to implement its program.

The snags with this are that firstly, the government has no exciting programs to offer or implement! Secondly, the President and his key ministers have been nowhere to be seen or heard at the critical times when things were on a knife edge, when people needed to be reassured or things needed to be explained about what was happening in the country.

The ruling SLPP government has more or less succeeded in upholding the framework of the corrupt system bequeathed to the country by its predecessors – the APC and the NPRC. If anything, it has been revealed as representing the vested interests of the country's small group of opportunistic politicians of a past era, who are supported by a small core of corrupt and ruthless youngish thugs masquerading as technocrats. They have cleverly parcelled out ministries to their supporters, forgetting that there is out there a mass of Sierra Leoneans who do not belong to their party nor share their own philosophy. Consequently it has failed to meet even the most basic social needs and democratic aspirations of the vast majority of ordinary Sierra Leoneans, such as their concerns about personal safety and national security. Most people feel that the government is only a government in name.

As for this ritualistic nonsense of being the democratically elected government, the least said the better. In any case, most of the cabinet ministers were not elected or democratically appointed! Careful examination of the ministerial line-up reveals precisely the opposite: that behind the façade of democracy, the present government is unaccountable at the best of times and has not been transparent in most of its transactions. Corruption continues even at a time when the country is enjoying the full attention of the world media. Besides, it is others who are taking the vital decisions for Sierra Leone, sometimes from outside the country.

This state of affairs should not be allowed to continue. It is time for Sierra Leoneans to take full control over their own affairs. We need change, and a radical one immediately. The present Cabinet must go – to give way to a new set of people who can concentrate solely on the specific agenda of steadying our ship of State and injecting a new realism into the thinking and the conduct of government.

National unity is the key

Under the dispensation that Focus advocates, the overarching emphasis should be on national unity and solidarity.

Can President Kabbah's government deliver this? No! Why? Because he leads a political party whose loyalty is naturally, understandably, first and foremost to its supporters. But since those supporters constitute a small majority in relation to the rest of the population who do not belong to it, it means that a large proportion of citizens is not represented within government. Even if they had an overwhelming majority on their side, the SLPP must accept that democracy is not just the rule of the majority but that it is also the power of the majority to look after the interest and welfare of the minority in society. We have witnessed blatant nepotistic appointments, with the allocation of ministries and government appointments not on merit but on extraneous loyalties that have largely been bought (we can name you a few ambassadorial appointments of this type!) or, in the rarest of cases, earned.

Focus on Sierra Leone has consistently stressed on national unity to confront the future. Our concern undoubtedly is a reflection of our awareness that divisions, and in particular ethnic divisions, exist politically and socially. In recent times these divisions have been exacerbated to the point of bursting into the open, by self-serving interpretations of who is to blame for the war and whether or not bad governance in this country begot the disgruntled men and women of the RUF and the AFRC who have used their grievances to unleash a most vicious war on the country.

It is crucial for now that the country is run without the added burden of a divided and polarised society. Only an interim administration of national unity – by its very mission to serve the national interest and composed of personalities who are trusted and respected across the entire nation - can avoid such pitfalls.

Party pressures frustrate the will of the President

Many people see the present government as part of the problem for Sierra Leone. It has taken many terrible decisions and made just as many serious errors of judgement that have led to horrendous consequences, including the death of thousands of innocent civilians; yet the very people who are responsible for these decisions have either kept their jobs or are still prominently associated with the workings of the government. It is disgraceful!

Here again internal party wrangling in the SLPP has been undermining the effectiveness of President Kabbah who will not act against these wreckers. But credit has to be given when earned and we must give it to Kabbah for once, publicly, telling the party that he is the President of all Sierra Leoneans.

In a letter to the party in August 1998, Kabbah who was being pilloried from all sides of the SLPP, was forced to react uncharacteristically robustly: "My own task" he wrote "is to improve the country for all Sierra Leoneans without forgetting to help the Party, to give you support, to give you encouragement. My role complements yours, for the development of our beloved Sierra Leone. Please allow me to concentrate on my main role. I am sure you are fully capable of fulfilling your own role, for which you will always get my support. And I am sure you will also help me to fulfil mine."

The letter continued: "My role here, as I plainly see it, is to recruit all men and women with meaningful contributions to make, and for all of them to join us in this national emergency. And in this context, I see myself as encouraging these helpers to help the nation." This was fine fighting talk but it all came to nought because he failed to show his resolve in his actions and subsequent appointments. He kept the wreckers in and brought more opportunists on board, including the "debris of failures of past years". (See Focus Vol 5 No 7.)

Sierra Leone, as Kabbah so rightly recognised, belongs to all of us. No one should be discriminated against or be made to feel unwelcome. We have enough problems dealing with a common enemy, i.e. the RUF and those others who want to reduce the country to rubble and ruin; so we cannot afford to expend our energies fighting among ourselves for what is left over by them.

In reality therefore, Focus is offering President Kabbah an honourable way out of his bondage by suggesting the alternative of an interim government. We know that he has been held hostage and undermined by sections of his own party and possibly others outside it. He can now boldly tell them where to get off because he will have the support of not only the sensible members of that Party (which once included this editor), but other Sierra Leoneans who do not belong to it or any other party, who simply want to do the best for Sierra Leone in the present circumstances.

We have reached a critical stage in the country's struggle for survival. It is no longer a party political issue. We went passed that stage a long time ago.

We have the people it takes …So let's use them

Focus believes that Sierra Leone has the men and women with the calibre, energy and zest to steer this sinking ship of ours into much calmer waters, and to lay the new foundations for the prosperity that is yet to come.

We need people who can instil confidence in the viability of our country's statehood and make us believe that we can stand on our own feet once again. We need somebody or group of people who can attract the broadest spectrum of support across the political, social and economic divide in the country. Above all we need strong men and women of proven character who are fearless in taking decisions honestly and with conviction, and are prepared to defend their actions and face the consequences. We want people who can instil in our gun-toting generation the confidence that if and when they lay down their weapons they stand to gain a better future for themselves. Above all we want those who can give real hope to the youth and the disadvantaged in Sierra Leone.

It is important that somebody strong and decisive leads this new arrangement. It is possible that once we assemble them together, they can meet in plenary session and agree among themselves on who shall lead them. But if President Kabbah really likes, and since he is the one that some of our key protagonists like Britain seem to favour (to our national detriment so far!) he can stay as President. In that case we must not let him continue to make decisions on our behalf, which lead us inexorably to our own suicides. Thus we might need to suspend that section of our Constitution that gives him extensive executive powers, remembering always that the Constitution is a living document that is meant to serve the people and not the other way round!

We would like to suggest names but the danger is that in present day Sierra Leone virtually every name becomes a target for personal abuse and denigration. But we have to dissociate personal/private antipathies from an individual's suitability and ability to perform a job. That is one key reason why the country accepted Tejan Kabbah and his ministers in the first place. But they have failed to deliver results. That is why Focus will continue to argue that they now give way and let others make their contribution.

Frivolous objections

There have already been spurious objections by some SLPP supporters to the idea of an interim arrangement to oversee the next phase of Sierra Leone's liberation. They say, not unreasonably, that they were elected in February 1996 to serve for four years and are even claiming that they should be allowed to serve till 2002 to make up for the periods of interruption during their rule, by the AFRC coup in 1997 and the rebel invasion of 1999.

This argument is, to say the least, most unhelpful. Surely if the present government were performing well the question of its continuation in office would not become an issue. But the fact is they have not performed. Even the SLPP members have been openly critical of the government and gunning for Kabbah for his lack of results as they see it. NO! As far as Focus is concerned, the SLPP has less than eight or so months to go before it faces a general election. Surely in the interest of peace and national unity it can forgo that period to ensure that we have in place an administration that engages the respect of everyone across the political spectrum and, most important of all, enjoys the popular support across the length and breadth of this country.

The question thus arises, how do we arrive at this decision if the need for it has been accepted?

We are bound to encounter serious problems here. For a start, the decision unfortunately cannot simply be left to civil society. Focus remains a strong advocate of the role of civil society. However, as one now sees things from abroad, civil society in Sierra Leone has itself been compromised and hi-jacked, and turned into a vehicle for peddling the personal ambitions of a few well placed individuals. As a result it has not been able to put the requisite pressure on the Kabbah government for reform.

Also, for civil society to be effective there has to be security. It is only in a peaceful and secure environment that people are able to move around freely, and to express their views. It is only when people feel free and secure that they can fully participate in the governance of their country. That has not been the case for a long while. In the absence of such a pressure group, faced with a non performing government, the only possible alternative is for a carefully selected set of patriotic people with integrity and drive, to be at the helm of the country's affairs until such a time that we can revert to multiparty politics and electoral competition.

Focus is under no illusion that this will be a tough idea to sell. There are those who are stuck like leeches to the hem of Kabbah's presidential robes and know that once he goes they too go with him. They are doing everything possible to block out all progressive views on the way forward for Sierra Leone.

Fortunately, the country has ample experience for making this kind of choice. The Bintumani Conferences of 1995/96 have been milestones in representative mass action in Sierra Leone. There is no reason why a decision about an interim administration for national unity (IANU) to oversee the country's affairs until real peace has been attained, cannot be canvassed or argued, and decided there. Bintumani II effectively signed the death warrant for NPRC military rule. So the precedent is there for such debated decision-making.

A National Consultative Council, with cross sectional representation from all walks of life, can afford us the ideal forum for the creation of IANU.

We invite the UN, Britain (if they do not want their good work to be in vain) and all other interested parties to put pressure on President Kabbah, and to use their good offices to facilitate the holding of such a conference even now, while the fighting still goes on. Sierra Leone cannot wait a day longer to embark on laying the foundations for its new structures for the future.

The Agenda

The sense of outrage felt by Sierra Leoneans following Foday Sankoh's and the RUF’s failure to comply with the peace accord does not excuse our government for failing even now to come up with a comprehensive plan that would serve as a framework for any eventuality following this latest setback.

For example, as late as today, it seems to us the only policy declaration by our Government, and citizens of Freetown who take their cue from it is "The British must stay". So what happens in the meantime? Do we sit and fold our arms until the war has been won against the rebels? If as a result of the Foreign Secretary Mr Robin Cook saying that his government will go all the way with the Kabbah Government the British do in fact stay, what complementary plans have been made to reinforce this presence?

So the British stay and they give us protection and raise a new army. What would we then be doing that would benefit everyone within the safe haven that has been created by the British?

1. The agenda for an interim administration must be precise and time limited.

2. It must make security of the state and of the individual its main concern. Therefore it must be at the forefront of all attempts to get a final resolution of the conflict, whether by the use of force, which we believe may not be the answer, or by negotiation and dialogue to which we will continue to advise that doors should not be closed. The important thing is that the interim administration should be seen to be in charge and taking the key decisions that matter. What it must not do is leave it to others, however well meaning they are in giving us their help and support.

3. It must develop a national project plan new institutional mechanisms that can accommodate the needs and demands of the broad range of social forces that exist throughout the country, especially the youth of Sierra Leone; and a timetable for implementation.

4. It must be an administration that will be seen as actively representing:

refugees living in the overpopulated camps, inside or outside the country's borders;

those separated from loved ones since the start of the war, internally and externally;

those who have lost the freedom to speak and organise even in their own country;

the many manipulated children who are forced to kill or be killed;

the vast numbers of physically maimed, psychologically damaged and the destitute;

all Sierra Leoneans disenfranchised by the war; and,

the rest of the population of whichever political persuasion.

5. It must invite input from all Sierra Leoneans, at home and in the Diaspora.

6. It must proactively go after, and cultivate, the support of the majority and the widespread plurality of Sierra Leoneans.

7. It must actively promote national reconciliation, in the sense as we understand it, namely as a healing of conflict in a thorough and complete sense, in an atmosphere of truthfulness and tolerance, wherein divergent views are permitted, and the powerless are genuinely given a chance to become part of the process.

One ought to point out that sometimes when people talk about national reconciliation they forget, probably are not aware, that it cannot be achieved through military means. Reconciliation is possible only through political means, and even then only when the majority of people of various political and ethnic persuasions accept it. For this to happen, leaders of the various communities including from authoritative bodies of the country and from all political parties should meet regularly and discuss the country's affairs. Only then will some consensus emerge about how to move the country forward.

8. Eventually set an election date, taking into consideration the state of preparedness of the country in terms of:

cessation of all hostilities

disarmament

accessibility of all areas of the country

Freedom of movement and travel

reconstruction of electoral boundaries

recreation of an national electoral register

Conclusion
In conclusion, ultimately Sierra Leoneans will gradually come to recognise that the government's capacity to act in a politically coherent, socially responsive and, above all, democratically accountable and legitimate way will be augmented only when participation is broad based. We need therefore a more democratic process of integration. This not just an ephemeral political demand, but it is the premise for those of us who are seeking to change the present system of government by means of introducing openness, transparency and accountability at every level, coupled with the fullest participation of the greatest number of our citizens.

SOME REACTIONS TO THE PROPOSAL FOR I.A.N.U

D

ear Editor of Focus

I welcome your call for an Interim Arrangement for National Unity (IANU). Like you I agree that we cannot seriously address a national emergency such as ours when we cannot even hear ourselves think above the rising cacophony of competing political elite and the eerie silence of a government bereft of solutions to our problems or the ability to lead us anywhere.

Let AH-YA-NU (IANU) be a rallying cry for change, reflection, renewal, redirection, and a fresh start. IANU's priority is nothing short of 'State Formation'. Yes, that’s right, state formation! We do not have a 'state' today. Whether it collapsed or ever existed in the first place, is for finer minds than mine to consider. Our task right now is to start the slow, painful process of state formation. This is the context within which I believe we should consider your very well argued concept of the IANU.

Issues for consideration

The composition of the IANU will be of central importance. It must reflect the balance of forces in Sierra Leone today; without such a composition, we doom ourselves to a continued period of chronic instability. Pragmatically speaking, those who are excluded cannot be so powerful as to render the IANU completely useless before it is even established. We would then have an interim arrangement as paralysed as the current government appears to be. But the IANU should not, and need not, be so inclusive as to incorporate those who are so clearly beyond the pale. A reconstituted RUF that is signatory to a new peace deal should be part of such an arrangement. OK, so Lomé is flawed. Then let’s learn what lessons we need to learn, fix it and move on. But let us not imagine that we can or should throw out the baby with the bath water, dirty though that is. The reports coming in from Sierra Leone tell the sad story of fragile pro-government alliances that are unlikely to be able to prosecute a war to a “logical conclusion” (as the eager warmongers advocate). Other reports we are getting, on the other hand, point to the importance of trust-building so that combatants – many barely in their teens ‑ can give up their increasingly pointless fight without fear of violent retribution.

IANU is not an appeasement to the RUF, AFRC or rebellious SLA soldiers, and we must not be deflected from pursuing the idea simply because the accusation is levied against us by those who feel threatened by it. It must also include the forces (now) opposed to the RUF that were excluded from Lome. The Sierra Leonean political scientist, Dr Yusuf Bangura, has told us about the “multi-ethnic bipolar” realities of Sierra Leone’s politics. In essence I interpret this to mean that elite groups between both the Mende and Temne tribes jockey for power and are able to mobilise enough forces within their respective ranks to upset the entire apple cart if they don’t like what is happening. Meanwhile, members from the multitude of smaller tribal and other civil society groups align themselves with these two dominant groups in ways that they feel best serve their interests. After all, whether the two elephants dance or wrestle, it is always the grass that gets flattened. The implications for the IANU are that we need both northern and southern interests to be well represented within the structure.

Political stability without wealth creation and technocratic capacity will not get us very far. That is why the IANU must pay close attention to the interests of Sierra Leone’s tiny and shrinking middle class. Among these dwindling ranks will be found the professionals to manage key tasks, treat the sick, build and manage the infrastructure, and so on. Moreover, some (sadly too few) within these ranks are also business people, again vital for any period of serious renewal. However, let us not forget other significant business players such as the Fula traders and business people who in recent years have played increasingly significant roles in commercial life of the country. But we must dispense with the ridiculous ideas whereby people are elected to head institutions such as the chamber of commerce, or their copycat replicas overseas, who have neither proven business acumen nor experience of running successful businesses. Just because a man has one or two houses in London does not qualify them to head a chamber of commerce. Populist pretensions should not become substitutes for productive input into the operations of these institutions.

Last but far from least, indeed most important in my view, the IANU must make space for the voiceless, poor, excluded, and disenfranchised majority in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s crisis is, in part, a youth crisis. Sure it is also about diamonds and external interference, about the failure of state formation, about globalisation, etc, etc. But let us not forget the youth at the heart of this matter. Young people – those in the bush and those not bearing any arms – must have absolute confidence that the IANU will not just represent but also actually serve their interests. We must be careful in this context to ensure that the interests of urban and rural dwellers – i.e. Freetown AND the rest of Sierra Leone – are served by this interim arrangement. If young people in large numbers have no stake in the IANU it will be doomed to fail and we will fail to break the cyclical nature of our current crisis. We will be here again before too long.

The young people of Sierra Leone have a strong moral claim to be part of an IANU. But the real thrust of my argument is that these are political actors whose actions, whether or not they are gun-toting and high on cocaine, have considerable political consequences for the rest of us. We ignore or marginalise them at our peril.

Although this is not the place to pursue the argument in detail, I suspect that our left-wing intellectuals have missed the point somewhat on this. They have looked for classical revolutionary behaviour or even potential among the ranks of the RUF, found none and dismissed them as “lumpen”. A mistake! We are only now beginning to understand the changing nature of social action taken by the dispossessed. We should not equate micro-political action with pre-political inaction.

Process and product

What I am drawing attention to here, Sir, is the importance of process and product. No longer can we sit back while the eloquent, the greedy and power hungry minority in Freetown sit down and stitch up a deal between themselves in the putative “national interest”. Any new constitutional arrangement must be participatory, not because participation is now the fashionable jargon of the day but because every Sierra Leonean has the right to a say in how s/he is governed.

The failure to extend citizen rights to all Sierra Leoneans along with failure in state formation explains our predicament today. As Nelson Mandela says “security for the few is insecurity for all”.

As a footnote to the question on composition, I would suggest that Sierra Leoneans in the Diaspora potentially have an important role to play in supporting the IANU. In return for concrete moral and material support, I would suggest that the IANU create structures to ensure that channels of communication and links with the Diaspora are maintained.

The task of IANU

So, if we can get the composition of the IANU right, what should it do? Here again, I agree with you and simply want to reinforce some points:

First, IANU should bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone.

Let me stress, lasting peace requires a good peace deal signed and implemented in good faith by all parties. We should constitute the IANU even before peace talks with the RUF are renewed. However, the IANU should make provision for RUF participation after it has signed a peace deal and for as long as it adheres to the disarmament, demobilisation and other requirements enshrined in that agreement. Like you, Sir, I hope that peace will come soon to Sierra Leone but we don’t know how soon. However, an IANU with broad legitimacy and with international support from the UN, ECOMOG, Britain, etc can prosecute a two-pronged strategy of peace enforcement whilst seeking sincere dialogue with the RUF. And this two-pronged strategy should sit centrally in a broader strategy for peace in Sierra Leone that the IANU would have responsibility for formulating and pursuing.

IANU will have to have right at the heart of its programme the elimination of poverty, social injustice, social exclusion and the pursuance of development that includes and involves the broad mass of Sierra Leoneans. This must not be bland rhetoric with no follow-up. We need to see clear targets, commitments and plans with careful monitoring and evaluation. Recent studies have shown that the burden of this war has fallen particularly heavily on women. Post-conflict development efforts must take this gender reality into account if we are to have lasting peace and security in Sierra Leone. All of these activities cannot, and should not, be concentrated in Freetown.

Without a social contract not just between governed and government but between different social groups with different interests, assets and capacities, our hope for national unity will be no more than a pipe dream never to be achieved. A call for national unity does not imply wishing away differences or conflicting interests, it means finding a framework within which those different positions can be reconciled, and non-compliance can be dealt with using the full force of legitimate and accountable instruments (if need be) of violence.

Let the IANU begin as we wish to see the country continue. Given the limited capacity that the IANU will have particularly in its early stages, these plans should not be over-ambitious because that could simply lead to a waste of valuable and scarce resources. Initial and unrealistically high expectations will be dashed early, thereby threatening the whole process once again.

Second, and bearing in mind my earlier comments about the need for state formation, the IANU must take on the task of building capacity not just in itself but also in the numerous other institutions that any viable state needs to survive and thrive. Of course, given the scale and depth of the crisis in Sierra Leone, this is a long-term challenge. But the sooner we start, the better.

Third, the IANU must address the very serious issue of the lack of leadership capacity in Sierra Leone today. This lack is of course an integral part of our problem. However, no country that is clamouring to be re-colonised by Britain with the zeal of our compatriots can ignore the obvious catastrophic loss of faith we now have in our own ability to lead ourselves. This is a profound problem that will take time and concerted effort and reflection to address. But we do have homegrown examples of principled and courageous leadership. The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL) has over past few years played a vital role in bringing together the various parties to the war and in creating conditions for peace. The IRCSL’s work is far from over. Indeed, now more than ever before we need these religious leaders to take courage from their early successes, learn the important lessons from all of our past failings and press on with the peace process.

Fourth, the IANU must pave the way for its own redundancy. This cannot be left to the last minute. Right from its very establishment, we must all be clear about the timetable for a return to normalcy. Let us not take Uganda’s no-party policy (since 1986) as an example to emulate. But through clear plans and regular reviews, we will be able to take a clear-sighted view of what progress we are making and whether our putative timetable for resumption of normal governance is viable.

Formidable obstacles in the way

The question is, will we get an IANU? I believe that if enough of us rally round and debate this issue and form a consensus around a need for an interim arrangement, we will achieve our goal.

However, significant obstacles stand in our way. The British government seems to be in the race for the right reasons but is backing the wrong horse and will not easily be persuaded to back what I believe is the right horse – the real forces for democratic change and governance in Sierra Leone. The current British government inherited a policy from the previous Conservative government and has failed to make the required significant and fundamental shift with that policy. Specifically, the British government should acknowledge that pushing for elections in 1996 was a mistake that has cost Sierra Leone dear.

A break with the policy would see Britain realise that it is not really dealing with a state at all, rather a bunch of politicians with some trappings of state machinery in place. The British government’s emphasis on building a Sierra Leonean army as one institution of a viable state points to its partial recognition of the problem. But this policy pursued without efforts to address other elements of state formation is extremely dangerous and may result in the creation of an overarching and overbearing army with none of the requisite checks and balances from other state institutions. Under such circumstances, the army is likely to operate in overtly political ways and, indeed, to prey on vulnerable civilians and emerge as a force for repression and exploitation. Sierra Leoneans will not in the future thank Britain for imposing even more effective and better trained 'coupists' to create more instability in years to come. This not to deny the personal courage and commitment of those now being trained to become soldiers of the new SLA, which I very much applaud.

British policy in Sierra Leone reminds me of the story of the little boy and the tar baby. I am too old now to recall the finer details of the story but it runs something like this: A little boy, walking down the road, sees a tar baby standing by and greets him. Not surprisingly, the tar baby, which is simply made out of the black tar used to cover roads ‑ completely ignores him. Offended at the tar baby’s apparent rude behaviour, the little boy delivers a severe slap to the tar baby’s face with his right hand. Being made of tar, the baby is sticky. The little boy’s right hand is stuck on the baby, which makes him even more annoyed. He uses his left hand to deliver what he believes will be the necessary final disciplinary punch. But this, too, gets stuck on to the baby. With both hands now firmly stuck, the outraged little boy resorts to kicking the baby …and ends up with both feet stuck.

We are approaching an election here in the UK; all the pundits are telling us that New Labour is in trouble with the electorate. The government will not do anything to damage its waning popularity. So, my fear is that Britain will do anything to extricate itself from its West African tar baby. Any quick fix will do and the long-term interests of the people of Sierra Leone will be incidental to this immediate priority. The onus is upon us Sierra Leoneans to offer the British a dignified disentanglement from its foolish habit of saying hello to a dumb tar baby. I believe that the IANU can be part of a constructive alternative to Britain’s current policy in Sierra Leone.

However, the IANU idea will come to nothing if Sierra Leoneans, inside Sierra Leone, do not embrace it and demand a sovereign national conference – a Bintumani III, if you like – to discuss the issue. Sierra Leoneans in the Diaspora can support our compatriots but we cannot, and should not, drive the process.

Time to demonstrate our commitment

As already noted, the idea of an IANU is a sound one. At very least, it generates a serious debate about our future. Let me therefore register my interest by calling for two things to happen in tandem:

First, let us hear from counterparts on the ground in Sierra Leone to tell us what they think of the idea.

Second, let us summon a meeting of interested Sierra Leoneans here in the UK to discuss the idea and to consider any alternatives, even those who think an IANU cannot work or is not the right approach, provided they too have concrete and reasoned ideas to offer.

We should not presume that those attending the meeting support the IANU idea, only that everyone present is willing to debate the matter in a mature fashion and put forward or consider viable alternatives to Sierra Leone's governance problem. Then, if there is broad support for the idea, let us form a broad-based IANU support committee to develop a strategy working in conjunction with similar structures in Sierra Leone and other parts of the Sierra Leonean Diaspora to move things forward.

Chukwu-Emeka P Chikezie Ferguson

London, UK

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D

ear Editor

I agree with the concept of an interim government for our problems at home. As I see it there can, under the prevailing circumstances, be no other viable and cost effective alternative. The option of a military victory over the RUF fighters, and a trial of its leaders including Mr. Sankoh is unrealistic and imposes so much suffering and misery on the people of Sierra Leone. We must persistently and rather vigorously pursue the option you have proposed.

Here therefore is my take on the matter. My proposal, which more or less falls neatly within your framework and therefore reiterates some of the points that you have already made, is as follows:

That we return to Lome as the basis of a fair and durable peace, but that we amend the accord to provide for an interim government for four years after the lapse of the tenure of Mr. Kabbah’s government. This is deemed absolutely necessary to prevent new atrocities against potential voters, if an election is called early next year. We must move away from narrow legalism to a broader and more realistic consideration of those factors that can facilitate peace. An election in the present state of affairs, despite the presence of UN peacekeeping forces, will be a provocation to violence.

That a monitoring mechanism be established within the Lome Accord to secure the effective implementation of the peace accord.

That the members of the RUF and AFRC incorporated into the government of Mr. Kabbah, as provided for by the accord, be given substantive functions and duties, and with expectations attached. They should not just be appointed to positions in name. Adequate facilities for the performance of these functions and duties must be provided.

That the government of Sierra Leone and the international community be made to realise that threats of prosecution for alleged war crimes do not help to reassure the RUF fighters of the sincerity of the amnesty provision in the Lome accord. Threats do not help to build the mutual trust needed to ensure demobilisation. The consequence of these threats is to warn those affected of the folly of laying down their arms. No man in his common sense is going to lay down his arms in battle, if he fears for his life, unless he is totally vanquished. This is, however, not the case in this war. The strength of the UN peacekeepers notwithstanding, this war will continue in one form or another. What we, however, want is genuine peace, security and personal safety. We do not want a situation of rebels turning to violent crime out of frustration and need.

That we start a no-immediate elections campaign now to avoid more bloodshed.

That President Kabbah heads the interim government in his capacity as incumbent President. It is only fair that this happens, to encourage him to co-operate with the move to establish such a government.

That the interim government include a Provisional Executive Council (executive arm), a Constituent Assembly (a deliberative and decree ratifying arm, which could be a more refined type of Bintumani Conference), a Constitutional Council for the purpose of mediating inter-organ or interagency disputes as well as supervising the process of drafting a new Constitution that is simple in language and form, for the benefit of the average citizen who is illiterate. The fact needs to be known that Constitutions charter political societies and endow them with legitimacy to wit the notion of popular sovereignty. Our traditional African constitutions did this through the recognition and adherence to traditional norms of governance. A Constitution is, and should always be, a political document written in legal terms without recourse to obfuscating terminology and style.

That to establish this interim government, a national conference be called by the present legislature and the President. Representatives or delegates should be drawn from the various segments of our population: ethnic and regional groups and groupings, professional and other occupational groups, basic institutions in society, such as education, law, business, religions, chiefs, leaders of traditional secret societies, the freemason societies, etc. The national conference should be empowered to come up with a wide pool of potential candidates chosen on the basis of standing in society or communities, but above all, integrity. It should also include people with useful skills pertinent to public affairs. Appointments to the Provisional Ruling Council and a selection of delegation and/or representatives to Constituent Assembly should be made from this pool.

That the interim government be allowed 3 or 4 years.

Priorities

The priority in the agenda of such a government should be:

1. To seek the peaceful demobilisation of the fighting men irrespective of claims of support. This should include even the government forces.

2. The creation of a new Sierra Leone Security Force, neutral in its allegiance, and loyal to the nation alone and under the control of the government of the day in accordance with constitutional principles and supporting decrees.

3. The emphasis on the duties of such a force should be common security with our neighbours, youth education and training, technical training and research related to development goals: Service will be directed to the building of roads, schools, clinics, experimental farms, and sanitation programs (countrywide). Efforts should be made to establish a new era for the military in public affairs that recognises their importance, but subordinates it to civilian control. War, says Karl Von Clausewitz, is diplomacy/politics in other form. This demonstrates the political nature of military engagements and the need for elected politicians to control the military, without politicising it.

4. Repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons.

5. Reconstruction and community development projects.

6. Revitalising agriculture, mining (such a government has a better chance of repossessing the mines!), fisheries, crafts industries and commerce.

7. Reconciliation through programs of re-education and conflict resolution and avoidance.

8. The need for public safety and personal security.

9. Re-socialisation of the youth into a non-violent political culture.

10. Reinforcement of democratic norms, and a culture of accountability by public officials and the public at large.

11. Establishment of a new set of reasonable criteria for political parties seeking recognition and eligibility to contest elections, to ensure that they are more inclusive of all in society, particularly ethnic and regional groups.

12. Arrangements for free and fair elections at the end of 3 or 4 years.

13. That agreement is reached to field a broad national coalition government for the first five years after such an election, to ensure co-operation, continuity and stability.

A call to action

Sierra Leoneans who mean genuinely well for their country must try to accept the IANU idea and agree on the items, and to co-operate fully to see it through. We must realise that we cannot achieve our goals by working separately. We have to accommodate our differences though we will need to be very extra careful to avoid some people who are clearly suspect in their intentions and activities.

In conclusion, let me re-iterate the point that we must first try to secure a return to Lomé Agreement. At the same time we must as sell the twin idea of no immediate elections at the lapse of the present government, and the need for an interim government for four years. All other things can follow. However, the uncontested right of Sierra Leoneans to sovereignty should be reaffirmed so as to give us, citizens, and an effective voice in finding a solution. The United Nations peacekeeping force should be limited to a peacekeeping role, not peace enforcement one.

The parties to the accord should implement the peace accord. Any disagreement among them should be referred to an independent monitoring entity for mediation within the framework of the Lome Accord.

Lastly, I strongly urge all our compatriots to endorse the Lome Accord, however badly framed and so recently ruptured by events, as a realistic and very moral beginning; for in our traditional culture, forgiveness is a virtue, even where murders are involved. We hardly will put people to death for such crimes, nor sentence them to confinement, so long as there is a demonstration of remorse by the offenders. Our notion of justice emphasises the need to restore harmony and rehabilitate the offenders. We must not always be led to adopting the ways of the West, particularly when they are inappropriate and injurious to our collective well being.

Dr Hamid Taqi

Atlanta, Georgia, USA

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D

ear Editor

Three cheers for being bold to bring up the idea of an interim administration for Sierra Leone. It is always a breath of fresh air to read your ideas, on the web or in your paper. I mean this in all honesty and my aim is not to flatter you.

At this material time, Sierra Leoneans need strong leadership with true grit, determination and good judgement - the stuff and strain of a good political animal - to give them inspiration, hope and clear direction. Instead, time and time again, our leaders have disappointed us, including the present one.

Of course we can always disagree but we should not become violently disagreeable. Instead we should be united in forging a way forward for our country, knowing fully well that the strength and ingenuity of everyone of our citizens will be needed for our recovery from the mortal wound that the civil war has inflicted on us.

Those who are truly interested in the peace and development of our country, and nothing else, must be pondering over which is the best way forward. The idea of an interim administration must have cropped-up in their minds. Unfortunately even now, opportunists are trying to derail this momentum for an IANU just because there is no personal political or material mileage in it for them. Instead they foresee in it, a rapid erosion of their current input and status. The fact though is that the vast majority of serious thinking Sierra Leoneans view the idea of an IANU as the only show in town. So if we want real peace, it is the only positive way forward to it.

The IANU idea has been in the works for quite sometime, even before the last Lomé accord, and had been welcomed by at least one of the signatories of that very accord. Some people simply wanted to fix-it, others wanted to give it more time, while others were not too sure if it should be brought to the public. Well thanks to you and others, it is now truly in the public domain.

Sahid Conteh

London, UK

WHICH NEW INTERVENTIONIST STRATEGY?

(A paper delivered by Ambrose Ganda, editor of Focus, at a conference on Sierra Leone, organised jointly by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and the Royal Commonwealth Society (RCS) at the Commonwealth Club, London WC2, on Friday 15 September 2000)

O

NE of the most lamentable developments in the last 10 years of war in Sierra Leone is the readiness and openness with which the so-called new world order is prepared to finance the war and not the peace. There is so much focus on war and its trappings both in substance and language, and so little on peace itself.

We have seen how much money has been poured into Sierra Leone to fight the rebels. I am one who boldly asserts that if I am given the equivalent sum, I would not only bring peace to Sierra Leone but will have millions of dollars left over to buy every gun from every rebel, rehabilitate everyone of them, give adequate material compensation to each of their surviving victims, and provide the basic needs of every Sierra Leone man, woman and child. For I believe that as long as there is a political will there would be a way out. But there will never be a way out while we, as a nation, remain trapped in a state of denial, actively encouraged by the outside world into believing that the rebels are just a transient group of alien nobodies, without a right to exist, and who should therefore be flushed down the plug hole.

The incontrovertible fact is that what is happening in Sierra Leone is the culmination of years of blatant injustices, bad governance, physical abuse of individuals, the impoverishment of large sections of our communities. Many were left in a state of nothingness and total disaffection as their conditions were glossed over by successive governments and the international community. This does not excuse the violence to date but it is a crucial factor that underlies the continuing violence that has ravaged the country.

The international community was more interested then, and is so even now, in maintaining the comfort and well being of the metropolitan ruling elite, largely in Freetown. That sentiment is clearly evident as I speak, because it is back to business in our capital – with people building new mansions, popping overseas to buy and export new Mercedes Benz and other luxurious cars, and contracts being awarded to the same bunch of discredited political friends and agents of those in government. A false economy is being generated with UN money doing the rounds, while Kabbah's ministers are bragging to their political opponents that the British presence will keep them in power for as long as they want. SLPP activists are claiming to their opponents that they will remain in power in perpetuity!

This is happening against the backdrop of a monumental deception that somehow there is a credible democratic government in Sierra Leone, and the charade of a President and his cabinet whose power and influence does not extend beyond twenty miles outside the Capital, Freetown. The interventionists are helping to create this misleading picture, possibly as an aide to camouflage their own hidden agenda.

These latter day saviours of my country fail to realise that intervention in what is a nasty but obvious internal conflict, albeit with external dimensions which are themselves traceable back to internal local administrative misfeasance and bad economic policies in the past, is only helping Sierra Leoneans to ease themselves into a state of dependency and complacency. The real problem is poverty. Kabbah rules by virtue of poverty. It is ordinary people - the poor classes - that are largely engaged, and affected, in this horrendous situation in Sierra Leone, whether they are RUF, CDF, Kamajohs, AFRC or ex-SLAs. Some half-baked disgruntled self-styled intellectuals may have aided the rebels but at the base of it all is the alienation of a large mass of youths from the main stream of national life, and their lack of a decisive stake in their society.

Those who wish to intervene to help our situation must be clear about their own objectives, as well as about the deciding factors that precipitated the war that they say they want to help us resolve. They must approach the issue with a clearly defined, not open-ended, objective – that is to say, the objective of making and keeping peace. My idea of a peace maker is someone who goes between two or more warring parties to effect a cessation of their disagreement and to facilitate a settlement, of their dispute, that will last so that they can, if possible in the course of time, resume normal relations. But, I have to say, the intervention so far has been too one-sided and threatening to the other parties to this conflict. And considering those other parties have not been defeated so far, it only helps to fan the flames of suspicion, mistrust, defiance and unwillingness to move towards putting an end to the conflict.

Though, overall, the beneficiaries of the safety cordon so effectively flung around Freetown, by Britain, are the civilian population, nonetheless a bunch of discredited, crooked and obnoxious politicians, some of whom themselves contributed to the factors that led to the outbreak of war in the first place, and whose sole aim is to lord it over the rest of us, are taking comfort under British wings. Intervention continues to give these people a blank cheque, enabling them to maintain standards of living not commensurate with their performance in and outside government.

There is, however, one kind of intervention that we must always support, i.e. humanitarian intervention, which one has urged from day one of the civil war, provided it is even-handed, non-partisan (except on the side of victims on all sides), above board and seen exactly for what it is. It must be decisive, resolute and speedy action to stop an abnormal state of affairs that threatens human survival. In Sierra Leone, we reached that state of affairs more than five years ago. But did anyone help to stop the carnage then? One wonders why they waited until now!

Ideally, the United Nations is best placed to carry out such an intervention. But this assumes that it is its own master, which it clearly is not. Secretary General Koffi Annan is seen by many as pampering to the wishes of the super powers. (He would not have got the job, some say, if they had felt that he would be a threat to them having things their way!) Members of the Security Council continued to play silly boys' war games while the world around them burned. Poor Sierra Leone was only a marginal dot on the globe that really did not count. But now our country has recently been discovered to have still more diamonds, gold, platinum, bauxite, rutile, etc. Further, if stories currently doing the rounds - first talked of some 15 or so years ago following the grant to BP, by late President Siaka Stevens, of exploration concessions whose results have never been disclosed - are to be believed, we too have viable deposits of oil! Suddenly we have become desirable and everybody flocks to save us from ourselves.

But as happened elsewhere, they are going about it in the wrong way. They are not talking to the parties. They are not encouraging the parties to talk to each other. It's all war, war! The quest now is for total victory and complete domination. This is not the kind of action that humanitarian intervention demands. It requires that any action taken in this respect must be, to borrow a Latin maxim usually applied to establishing prescriptive rights of ownership, nec clam; nec precario i.e. not by stealth and not by permission. The maxim also imposes a third condition, nec vi, against the use of force; but force may be required when it is judged to be absolutely necessary to end the immediate threatening situation. The invasion of January 1999 was one such instance; the other, possibly, was in May this year when there was talk of another invasion after the collapse of Lomé.

When it comes to peace making and/or peacekeeping, there are disturbing conundrums. One sees contradictions not just in behaviour but also in terminology, which only go to undermine the prospects of Sierra Leoneans ever living in harmony with each other. To me peace means reconciliation. You cannot have peace without reconciliation. But the act of reconciliation is not an abstract concept. It is a reality that is embedded among the people, and in their politics. Ultimately, reconciliation is related to a state of mind whereby the actors accept in their minds and hearts that they have no other option but to learn, and accept, to live with their fellow men and women. The process for bringing the population to such heightened states of consciousness, in thought and action, is the medium of politics via the political and community leaders of our society.

Our leaders have to learn to talk the language of peace and reconciliation. At the grassroots in Sierra Leone there is a remarkable willingness for reconciliation. But, sadly, it is not reflected at the national level, especially from listening to the utterances of our political leaders in government. Remember politics in Sierra Leone has proved many times to be a source of great division. That is why the talk of elections makes me cringe with fear because it reinforces my belief that there are those who refuse to accept the argument about an interim government of national unity, because they know that they can prey on the prejudices and fears of the electorate to retain or gain power and dominate.

The other side of this coin is represented by the rather perverse sense in which the word peace has come to be interpreted upon eventualities like intervention and/or peace-enforcement. There is an inherent contradiction in terms when people talk about peace enforcement. You cannot force peace on people who are neither ready for it, nor want it. And you cannot impose a peace unless you are a victor. But then it ceases to be peace because it lacks consensuality. What you really end up doing is to impose your own solutions and dictate your terms to the other party, as long as you have the means and power to do so. That is the current situation in Sierra Leone. The rebels do not want peace, except on their own terms; the politicians do not want peace except on their own terms. They all feed on each other's bigotry. So now everyone is pulling all punches for final victory – victory that continues to elude both sides. As a result the violence increases and the resolve to win, and not to lose, stiffens on all sides.

The UN should stick to its role of peace making – which should be qualified as impartial peace making - when segments of our society are at each other's throats. Intervention must be seen to be even-handed to earn the respect and co-operation of all the parties; otherwise it runs into serious difficulties, as time has already proved. To this effect I humbly submit that the seemingly independent approach adopted by the British Government which talks about taking the fight to the rebels while at the same time preparing a new army for battle, is very much at odds with their saying that they are there to reinforce UN peacekeeping. I believe it seriously undermines the UN's credibility in this respect. One is also at a loss to explain why the developed countries of the world habitually refuse to put their soldiers under the UN's command, to carry out its peacekeeping mandate. British troops under (not aside from) the UN mandate in Sierra Leone would have helped greatly to add weight and credibility to the UN presence.

I fear now that Britain may well see its role in Sierra Leone not so much as a peacemaker but as pacemaker for a moribund and lack lustre government. Thus it is conducting the government's war against the rebels, which is understandable and is appreciated by most Sierra Leoneans since our government can not fulfil one of its most basic functions, viz. the protection and security of its citizens. Unfortunately for Britain, she will very quickly come to be seen as a partner of this discredited government by many of their political opponents. Some of them are accusing the British of running the government of Sierra Leone by proxy.

Certainly but for the massive British subvention, Sierra Leone would not have a government or the means to function economically. Embarrassingly for the British Government, their man Kabbah has become unpopular and his government has fallen out of favour with the people who elected it. Even members of his ruling SLPP are ambivalent about his leadership of their party. The question therefore that one has to ask is this: Are the interventionists mindful of the need for peace and harmony between the political factions in our civil society? That is a further reason why it has been suggested that in place of another divisive electoral competition, the country should be helped to create an interim administration for national unity.

It is also unusual that we have no other agenda existing along the path to peace except that which preaches militarism and domination. It is a curious way of conducting peace. The soldiers whom we are training today may well be the coup makers of tomorrow because the political system that they are being trained to protect is corrupt, does not reflect the will of the people, and itself created the conditions that have divided the people of Sierra Leone. The real issue in Sierra Leone is one of privilege, poverty and disadvantage. These operate almost exclusively against ordinary people. The political system that is now being buttressed will very quickly collapse once the British and the UN have left our shores. Why? Simply because it is not rooted in the consciousness of the average person in the street.

The political system of Sierra Leone for at least the last 30 years has been based on keeping the majority in a state of total dependency, dropping just enough crumbs from the table to keep them fed (first), but denying them a stake in society whilst the political cats kept all the cream. Conditions like these lead to friction and, ultimately, civil wars. Therefore, like their predecessors, the new military too cannot be relied on solely to keep the peace. It is foolhardy for anyone to assume that somehow a new army is going to get rid of all the conditions that gave rise to the civil war in Sierra Leone - conditions that existed under the (previous) SLPP, APC, NPRC, AFRC, and now the SLPP of today under Kabbah.

It should be remembered also that less than ten years ago, the average persons in the street used to include the thousands of youths who are currently holding the country to ransom. With guns in their hands they believe that they have nothing to lose. They have mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, and friends who are sane and law abiding, living normal lives in present day Sierra Leone society. Recent events involving the activities of the West Side Boys, whose relatives not only condemned their action but also pleaded with their children for the release of the British military hostages, proves the point. Ask yourselves how many youths have since gone and joined the rebels since the invasion of January 1999? I am told thousands.

Of course it is also easily forgotten that intervention by itself is a source of constant replenishment for the rebel arsenal. Simply by carrying out ambushes of allied, UN, British and Ecomog forces, rebels have been able to acquire uniforms (which they use to impersonate legitimate forces), heavy machine guns and artillery. By their ability to attack and break into sensitive depots they are also able to replenish their stock of food and medicine, etc. And in a war that is essentially about access to wealth at all levels, that is not to minimise the fact that there are rogue elements of all sides, such as odd UN, Ecomog, or SLA soldiers who trade their weapons or turn a blind eye to rebel atrocities in exchange for some favour, e.g. a diamond or stereo or other valuable item that has come into their possession by force. These events only help to prolong the war.

One is aware of the problems that the UN has encountered in Sierra Leone but they are problems of its own making. The UN should be encouraged to revert to its traditional role of peace making between warring factions. It must not be forced to go down the discredited route of imposing peace simply because of its bad experiences in the past. Some of its failures however can be explained by the fact that the UN has often been saddled with implementing bad agreements – agreements that have been put together by bad and insincere negotiators with an eye simply to quick fixes rather than genuine attempts at an all-embracing and comprehensive settlement. Its other bad experiences can simply be put to its internal organisational defects, bureaucracy and misuse of resources.

Yet if even one-fourth of the vast sums that are being used right now on preparing for war in Sierra Leone are spent on community activities and actions for peace, an awful lot can be achieved within a short space of time. Thousands of those who are not involved or engaged in the conflict have, nevertheless, connections of varying degrees with the men and women in the battlefields. According to one of the members of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace in Sierra Leone, Dr Dennis Bright, in his speech at Conciliation Resources in London recently, "there is hardly any family left in Sierra Leone whose membership does not include perpetrators as well as victims of the war".

This fact alone should be the catalyst for engaging communities as agencies for peace making, remembering always that the rebel fighter/killer of today was once a fully-fledged member of their own community. It is that community that we must turn into a magnet, so as to re-attract the people of violence from the bush back into the mainstream. Again, in the words of Peace Commissioner Bright "when simple development initiatives are ignited in various parts of the country…it sends signals to those stuck in the bush that a peaceful Sierra Leone has something to offer them too, and creates a favourable condition for true demobilisation and reintegration". Surely it does not need billions of dollars to make this reality possible, does it?

One is aware of how intervention and the risk of political fallout from failure has paralysed the US, one the greatest powers on earth. But in those cases also, the strategy that the US sought to apply was wrong in so far as both they and their protagonists believed in their own superiority and might, and therefore lost sight of their main goals, which was to bring the warring factions together and create a corridor for genuine interface and deliberate and calm consideration of all the factors involved. Any purported solution short of that is in essence simply papering over ugly cracks that are bound to reopen later.

But why can't the international community try for a comprehensive settlement that takes into account the history of the country, the people and their political system, which in Sierra Leone's case has been totally rotten at the core since shortly after independence? Why not help the country seek an agreement that maps out a new society based on equal opportunities for everybody, fully accepting that there are degrees of abilities among our people - some strong, some weak - and therefore the need to protect and support each other.

If intervention can facilitate such positive thinking among civil communities then half of their work to make peace between our peoples will have been done, with less pain and suffering. But even that won't happen if most of the talented people of the country are excluded from governance and the process of decision-making.

That is why, again, the international community must push the authorities in Sierra Leone into accepting that in the present precarious circumstances, the least painful but solely effective way forward for the country now, is the formation of an interim government for national unity to hold the reins of power temporarily and facilitate representation of all sections of Sierra Leone's diverse community.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE WEST SIDE BOYS

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very large number of the Westside Boys, who seized 11 British military troopers last August, is comprised of children of former soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). Most of them were born and bred in the barracks at Wilberforce, Juba, Murray Town and Benguema (now occupied by British troops training the new SLA, from whence emerged their British captives). Their parents were serving military personnel, mostly NCOs with ranks no higher than Warrant Officer Class I and 2. Because they grew within the environment of the barracks, these kids went to its schools but most of them never acquired formal qualifications like an 'O' level GCE.

Parents enlisted their children in the army under a recruitment system, which at that time was based not on old traditional criteria like competence, physique or physical fitness, etc., but on a rather contentious and politically inspired basis. Recruitment was done officially through political patronage and paternalism, using a card system whereby power-hungry politicians of the then ruling party (APC) were allocated a number of cards entitling them to bring in recruits from their area, constituency and/or tribe. The use of these cards was extended to colleagues and senior members in the hierarchy of the army who also engineered entry into the SLA for the children of the men and women in their command units. These recruits had not received proper military training when the war broke out in 1991. `

Also, those who were not recruited at that time took opportunity to get into the army when the NPRC seized power in 1992 and called for emergency nation-wide mobilisation. Many young people simply joined up and were sent to the warfront after crash training in weaponry, weapons handling and firing.

When President Kabbah and his government took power in 1996, one of their very first and most contentious actions was to retire several of the old soldiers, among whom were many parents of some of these kids. To be fair to Kabbah, the decision had been taken to retire the men long before he arrived on the scene. But the speed with which he did it, and the timing especially in light of the prevailing background events at the time, were extremely ill-advised. It put him on a collision course with the national army. There was no pension scheme in operation, except on paper. The spouses and dependants of soldiers who were killed at the warfront had no compensatory or pension schemes to fall back on.

In their most generous of gestures, successive governments in Sierra Leone have used the politics of rice – whereby it gave soldiers a bag of rice on the cheap at 100 Leones per bag, against a going market price of 20,000–25,000 Leones. In the case of widows of soldiers who died in battle, the government allowed them to continue to draw their salaries that amounted to less than 20,000 Leones, the basic wage and, again, the equivalent of a bag of rice.

When the Kabbah government retired the last batch of soldiers this time, they were given only one or two bundles of zinc and a little token amount. The war had gone to their regions and destroyed their homes and people had fled from their villages and hamlets. Some of them now had to stay with friends within the city, or its outskirts. Some went back to their towns and villages in the provinces. As the war continued, children who should have been looking look after their parents could not do so because most them had been taken away to the warfront. Thus when the 1997 coup took place, these young poorly trained soldiers saw it as their chance and supported it, rallying round to the call of their officers to continue fighting the RUF. But then Lt Col Johnny Paul Koroma decided he wanted to make peace with the RUF and invited it to join his AFRC government. So commenced the open alliance between the SLA and the RUF. But prior to that, the collusion between rebels and certain personnel of the SLA, though undeniable, had been illicit.

Restoration of Kabbah's government led to most of the senior hierarchy of the army being court-martialled and 24 of them brutally massacred by the State - even though the Nigerian President of the court-martial acknowledged that the junta had a functional government and the majority of them were under command and were just carrying out the orders of the army.

One has recently been reliably informed that the children, relatives and subordinates of some of these murdered men, and woman, are among the West Side boys.

It is probably also legitimate to speculate about the motivation of this group and why they refused to pay heed to Lt Col Johnny Paul Koroma, their erstwhile leader, when he called on them to support the Kabbah government for peace, or during the hostage crisis when he pleaded with them for the release of the British paratroopers. They seem to nurture a grievance especially against the government of Tejan Kabbah that is too deep-seated. It would not be far-fetched to speculate further that, during the negotiations to release the British hostages, one operating factor on their minds could well have been the fear that they could suffer a similar fate at the hands of the same government that put down their officers. There is great mistrust between all factions in Sierra Leone's war and each one feeds off the others' fears.

One of the Westside Boys' heroes, the son of an utility man employed in the army, was the late Captain SAJ Musa who, upon the ousting of the AFRC from Freetown, escaped with his men to the northern part of the country. He did not go with others, like the AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma, to the south where the RUF had its HQ. Instead, he set up a base, with his followers, in Kabala. It was on their way to stage the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, an operation whose principal aim was to avenge the execution of their former SLA colleagues, that Musa was killed by a bomb fragment near Benguema barracks. The majority of the West Side boys were his men. Musa was one lucky one who managed to gain one GCE O level.

The British action against the Boys, to release their hostages, seems to have succeeded in dealing them a terminal blow, much to everyone's, including former AFRC Chairman Lt Col Johnny Paul Koroma's, relief. But the reaction of the remnants who probably still number a few hundreds or more, like the course of the war itself, will remain just as unpredictable.

The captured leader of the West Side Boys, 'Brigadier' Kallay, is said to be 24 years old. Sierra Leone's civil war has been raging for nearly ten years. He would have been only 14 years old when it started. That should be enough food for thought for those who now wish to put child soldiers in Sierra Leone – one group of victims of this war – on trial!

PUBLISH …

AND BE DAMNED

Ambrose Ganda

Blanket amnesty/International war tribunal

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y point of view on this may sound provocative but I hold to it passionately. It is that an agreement such as Lomé, which was meant to bring the civil war to an end, should not have been treated as if it was an agreement recklessly to grant immunity for wrongdoing. This was, unfortunately, the blandly inept and misleading notion – mischievous in any respect – that notably Amnesty International and the US Human Rights Watch propounded to their audiences. To this day both continue to hold fastidiously to their positions. The result was that confidence in the effectiveness of Lomé was seriously undermined from day one of its coming into force, and even before the ink of the signatories had dried up.

We also had the unseemly spectacle of one of the putative moral guarantors and key role players of the agreement – the United Nations – publicly, paradoxically, entering a reservation on the clauses dealing with the amnesty, while Mary Robinson, the UN's High Commissioner for Human Rights, was doing global rounds whipping up a maelstrom of ambivalence over peace or continuing warfare. It is this institutional ambivalence of the human rights lobby that needs to be corrected urgently to avoid confusion in future.

At the same time, I do have to make a candid assertion. It is that the grant of a pardon– in Sierra Leone's case blanket amnesty under the Lomé Agreement - to rebel aggressors, some of whom admittedly are of the worst kind ever, is clearly at odds with the norms of the rule of law in any democratic society. My point however is that by any standards, Sierra Leone is not a democratic society, no matter what anyone might say. The government is not democratic nor are the prevailing conditions of life by any stretch of the imagination, what with a permanent state of emergency in force! Not even the vapid and sometimes patronising tantrums of external ethical purveyors of this illusory notion can alter that fact. This hollow pretence that somehow Sierra Leone is a normal society borders on intellectual dishonesty and must stop. Instead the reality and experience on the ground must be considered.

The indisputable fact is that, whether we like it or not, a horrible civil war is being fought in Sierra Leone and it has gone on for close to 10 ugly years. Thus the consequence of such a fact alone, in the words of the UK Guardian newspaper of July 29, in its editorial approving the decision to let loose known mass IRA and Loyalist killers on to the streets of "civilised" Belfast, is that "...when it comes to making peace, the normal rules cannot always apply either …The painful fact is that when wars are ending justice sometimes has to take second place to ensuring peace".

It only needs to be said that that whatever happens, the worst brutes on all sides must be made to give account but I do not think that an international tribunal is the best forum for that. The cart is being placed ahead of the horse. What needs to be put into place first is a credible Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate these matters, and elicit the facts upon which a decision to prosecute the very worst offenders can be safely and fairly made. Then a court, and it not need to be international, can be empowered to undertake a criminal trail. Most international criminal courts/tribunals tend to be set up during or after a war and operate unfairly because they already presume the guilt of the accused however much they wrap their terminology in legalistic verbiage; and the accused are always the 'losers' of the war. How many brutish killers have not fought their way to power in many countries and stayed there with the tacit acquiescence of the so-called 'conscientious' moral world order?

In the main, international criminal courts and tribunals: (a) always run the risk of only serving to play to the public gallery and inadvertently satisfy, thus pamper and succumb to, the excesses of those who are out to seek revenge for whatever reasons; and, consequently, (b) do not solve or even address the political problems inherent in the conflict but gloss over the crucial facts that need to be brought to light, to explain and make everyone understand the root causes of these horrendous events and the motives and the identity of some of the largely anonymous persons behind them.

It seems to me that this development in Sierra Leone is a knee-jerk reaction that is aimed at extending the Arusha Tribunal’s remit to crimes against humanity. But lest it should be forgotten, one must point out (in the words of a BBC teletext commentary) that "in those countries, as in Yugoslavia (until recently), Burundi, Mozambique and Angola, the people accused of atrocities were/are in power, too powerful to be tried, or have been brought into the state structure as part of a negotiated peace process. What made Rwanda different was the fact that the war in that country was won outright". So maybe the objective of the present manoeuvres in Sierra Leone by the UN and the British Government should be seen as a move for decisive victory. In the absence of that, it is a waste of time and money trying Sankoh and any others, not to talk of putting on trial child soldiers who are just as much the victims of this war.

The vexed issue of conflict diamonds

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he answer to the issue of conflict diamonds is that it is directly related to the availability of arms and the ease with which foreign-based nationals can be used as conduits, both for the purchase and the transhipment of weapons. There has never been a political will to come down hard on the arms traders and dealers – the purveyors of death and misery - and their middlemen and couriers who are based in the countries of the protagonists of this charade of a regulatory certification initiative. Whom are De Beers, the British and the Canadians fooling? Give us a break, please!

Who will defend the interest of Sierra Leoneans now that Kabbah and his men have sold us out? Since when did diamonds benefit Sierra Leoneans, that we now have such interest in certification as a panacea for the years of exploitation by ministers of government and their business friends and partners overseas? Ask the people of Kono who have witnessed the defacement of their land. When one grew up as a kid in the late 50s, we heard about Katanga in Sierra Leone. No, not the Katanga in the Congo but that in Sierra Leone! Do you know what it was about? It was an outbreak of unparalleled violence, in reaction to attempts to control the mining areas owned by the mining company SLST and the colonial Sierra Leone government. It boomeranged and there was fighting and murders to the extent that Kono was declared a no-go area. For a long while you had to secure a formal permit to enter the Kono district. Historical perspectives like these are often absent from debates about events in Sierra Leone. We are solely focused on the recent events and seem unaware of other key factors for decisions that have to be taken.

Now, fancy this! They have been concentrating on Liberia when there is free transit across the borders between Guinea and Northern Sierra Leone, with Lebanese and Indian merchants, who are based in Conakry, going in and out at will. If you were a diamond dealer would you go to Liberia to buy diamonds when world attention is focused on that country? They tell me business is booming across the Guinea border like never before.

For months, diamond mining has been taking place in areas that are relatively safe and away from the fighting, and from rebels. Yet we have heard little about the yield of gemstones from there. So if ‘pro government forces’ hold areas that do not feature in the conflict, does that make them and their pickings exempt? In fact, I hear that in some areas, a kind of modus vivendi has been agreed between rebels and Kamajohs on demarcation lines, with each side undertaking not to encroach on the other’s turf. This whole exercise is just another big humbug and the high point of hypocrisy. They should be stopping arms production and sales.

Those who are claiming credit for this sham exercise should be ashamed of themselves. Let me explain further what I mean:

Rebels do not fight with diamonds. They fight with arms.

Rebels do not manufacture arms they buy them.

Rebels would not buy arms if arms did not proliferate all around them.

Even when arms proliferate like they do, in our case they would not reach rebel hands if there were not people prepared to fly them into war zones where rebels operate. Rebels do not make or fly their own aeroplanes!

Rebels dig diamonds but neither their captured slaves nor their compatriots have the resources to buy diamonds from them. They need external agents – largely foreign nationals - to purchase it from them because only the latter have the capital and the means to travel. As far as I know there are no bans on these death merchants to travel out of their countries in Europe and North America. They will take their governments to the European courts for the infringement of their own Human Right (to travel freely and trade in death)!

There are no laws prohibiting the manufacture of arms or their proliferation. Only pathetic half measures have been taken to stop the production and selling of arms. Take for example the issue of landmines. Often, it has been some of the very protagonists of diamond certification that have been stalling on signing (and implementing) the ban on the manufacture, sale and use of these deadly items. The hypocrisy is that the strongest advocates of this silly idea of conflict diamonds fuelling wars in Africa, which is true enough, are themselves the largest producers of the arms that are bought with proceeds from the sale of diamonds. They will not stop producing the arms because their economies – i.e. the jobs and the livelihoods of their citizens - depend on it to a considerable degree. Shall we now expect that they too will be brought to the international tribunal as traders in the merchandise of death?

Someone needs to explain why they are wasting everybody's time talking this rubbish about banning conflict diamonds when everyone knows that people with money only need to buy and hoard them – since they are rich enough not to need to resell them right away – until the conflict ends and the embargo is lifted. But it won’t stop them paying the (possibly) now deflated price to rebels or rogue government ministers? I hear that Hatton Garden in London is still doing brisk trade with Sierra Leone ministers and their emissaries who have been down there regularly selling the ‘bloody’ stones.

If Sierra Leoneans are again being so stupid to allow themselves to be led up the garden path, I take this liberty to opt out. This is simply a waste of time. It assumes that the government of Sierra Leone – the overseers of this process of certification - are themselves transparent, which, of course, they are not! The analogy with drugs is compelling – the only difference being that whereas drugs have been pushed underground after regulations to control their abuse, diamonds naturally occur underground and the trade in Sierra Leone diamonds has, for years, with or without conflict, been sui generis illicit. Smuggling has always been a feature of the trade. It would not be a problem now if it were done in the open. So the minister of mines is wasting time and precious money globetrotting for certification. You can only certify diamonds that have been brought to light. Even then the bloodstains would have been washed away by the time they get to the dealers. The smuggling and the collusion with the smugglers will go on.

The neutering of Lomé

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he Lomé agreement’s prospects were badly compromised simply because people failed to appreciate the complexity of the circumstances on the ground, when the violence was at an all-time high. Months afterwards, we are still facing the same 'chicken and the egg’ dilemma. You cannot punish the people who are committing atrocities without them first laying down their arms, or without you overpowering them and clipping their wings. Simply by issuing threats to punish them does not encourage them to lay down their arms.

Let’s be honest for once. If you are accused of carrying out some of the vilest brutalities upon the persons of your compatriots and you know that all the forces of the 'civilised' world are waiting to hunt you down and take you straight off to an international tribunal which may order your execution or, if you are lucky, incarceration for life, would you willingly give up the only thing, i.e. your gun, that stands between you and such a fate? Would you, knowing the precedent set by the Sierra Leone government in publicly butchering your senior officers and peers following a patently farcical and vindictive treason trial, willingly turn yourself in? Was it therefore any surprise that months after the signing of Lomé, scarcely any weapons were handed in by the rebel groups? FEAR is the reason, and there is fear all around, even among rebels!

Lomé was an agreement signed between two warring sides neither of which had won decisive victory over the other. If Foday Sankoh was guilty of bad faith, so too was Kabbah for stalling on its provisions, which created doubts in the minds of those who may have been led to believe that it was negotiated for their benefit. But even after the Sankoh fiasco, nothing excuses the attitude adopted since then relating to the validity (or not) of the agreement. Surely, the fact that one party – in this case one individual (Foday Sankoh) allegedly - decided to jettison the agreement does not give a license to the rest of the parties to do likewise. It was bad faith on both sides that led to the breach of the agreement and Sierra Leoneans have been made to pay for it dearly, in some cases with their lives.