| The present climate of confusion and threats of disruption apart,
there are already stark indications of the possible shortcomings of the
Lomé Agreement. The agreement tempted fate by leaving many issues
to the subjective interpretation of the parties, which is bound to lead
to interminable problems for implementation.
Three examples come to mind:
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The agreement talks about President Kabbah appointing RUF ministers. Indeed
the Attorney General stressed the issue, almost to the point of devaluing
the essence of the relevant provision in the agreement during his address
on the occasion of their London visit, that "President Kabbah will appoint
and will decide"; "The RUF will only nominate and submit a list".
Thus Lomé does not say which specific ministries will go to the
RUF. It barely says they are entitled to four Cabinet posts, one of which
is a senior portfolio, and four deputy posts. It has been argued,
rather fatuously, that it was to keep in line with the Constitution and
the President's powers of appointing ministers. Poppycock! Considering
the RUF and (if they are still together) the AFRC were not elected; did
not take part in the elections that brought Kabbah to power; almost certainly
do not, by their very act of waging war on Sierra Leone, recognise the
present parliament; and have reached thus far purely through their overwhelming
use of force and arms; this plea of constitutional adherence is unavailing.
So what if Kabbah gives a ministry to the RUF and they do not want it because,
for example, they consider it is not prestigious enough? What if the RUF
refuses that post and demands another? Having gone to the extent of accepting
that these people were entitled to a number of ministries, why was it not
possible to spell out which these were at the Lomé Talks, so as
to avoid unnecessary bickering afterwards? Politicians love to engage in
horse-trading which, one suspects, is taking place right now while RUF
and government ministers rub shoulders in a strange kind of camaraderie.
But the reality is that none of this bears any immediate impact on the
combatants on the ground who have yet to understand what is, or is not,
their "entitlement" under the agreement.
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We
have already pointed out the fallacy in believing that the rebel opposition
is a homogenous group or movement encompassing the aims and expectations
of the various military groupings that make up its amorphous resistance
to Ecomog and Kabbah's Government. Will the RUF be sharing its crop
of ministries with the AFRC or the other factions who have been fighting
alongside it? And what if the other groups do not accept the RUF's offer
to share? Is anyone really surprised that we are already witnessing a power
struggle within the rebel fraternity even before any appointments have
been made?
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Finally, the key issue of Sierra Leone's resources has been the bottom
line over which everyone has been fighting. True, the agreement emerged
with a Commission for the management of strategic resources, national reconstruction
and development and elaborate mechanisms for exploitation, etc. But its
purpose is largely aspirational. One would have preferred to see coming
out of Lomé at least a rudimentary development plan to which all
parties subscribed and committed themselves for say the next 18 months
to two years. As it stands, whose economic and development theory is to
be applied to the governance of Sierra Leone during this period? The RUF's,
the SLPP Government's, or the AFRC's. If potentially vast amounts of money
are going to be generated from exploitation of our natural resources, what
plan has been worked out for their disbursement and application, and to
which specific priority areas? There should have been clear and more definite
indicatives and agreement on issues like, for example, revenue generating,
distribution and, especially, local retention of proceeds where a national
resource is derived from a particular locality. These should have been
dealt with so that we set out from a baseline for short-term development
on which all the parties were united and had agreed to implement. The closest
that the agreement gets to acknowledging this fact is in Article VII, paragraph
6, which talks in mealy-mouthed fashion about the proceeds from the transactions
of gold and diamonds being public monies to be put into a special Treasury
account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra
Leone.
It seems that every ounce of energy was put into the mechanical production
of the Agreement, which is not a bad thing. But the rush to clinch a deal
led to many corners being cut. Yet the rush was not necessary because the
desire and the urge for peace were there among the parties; the cease-fire
was holding at the time; the talks, though difficult, were progressing.
They should have continued with the talks to ensure that every possible
ground was covered. After all there was still plenty to do out in the former
battle zones, such as consolidating the cease-fire and putting confidence-building
measures into place. All areas susceptible to misunderstanding should
have been cleared first before rushing to a deal.
Nevertheless Lomé will and must stand, but must be improved.
One expects that the various commissions envisaged under the agreement
will engage in some strategic thinking once their work commences so that
nothing contentious takes them by surprise. Short of advocating a return
to the drawing board, it is the least that one can demand!
10/10/99
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FURTHER
THOUGHTS ON LOMÉ