• There was unmistaken unhappiness at the both the size and performance of the Cabinet. The majority thought that in addition to a drastic reduction in the number of Ministers - hence Ministries - the issue of the overlap and duplication of portfolios should be addressed in order to avoid conflict. Greater use should be made of Sierra Leonean technocrats, both inside and out of the country, who have some degree of probity and competence. In other words your team needs to be trimmed down drastically and sharpened up so that it becomes more effective. Some members expressed disappointment that some of the technocrats you appointed have not performed well, or at all, and that this could pose a serious problem for you in the long term. Now is the time to deal with such problems and you would need to be a lot more aggressive and adventurous with your appointments. Your recent reshuffle might have gone some way towards addressing their disquiet but I very much doubt if that was enough.

•  There was a rather surprising, almost flattering, endorsement of the current Finance team - except the Minister - who was described as "totally out of his depths". I was surprised that you did not feel he should go now. But you should leave the present team of technocrats, including Swaray, Samurah and others (who were mentioned by name), because they seemed to have been accepted as de facto competent performers, in spite of the "minister's failings". (Was there any reason why Dr John Karimu, whom you have correctly brought into your government, was not given his previous portfolio [of Finance]?)

• There was positive endorsement all around the table for yourself, personally, as a very suitable, able and wise leader. But most were equally blunt in stating that you were not decisive or taking the firm action against wrong doing that was necessary for you to stamp your mark and make a distinction between your regime and the previous ones. Nearly everybody, including myself, agreed that there was a golden chance for you to make your mark with [… removed for legal reasons …] and the others over the passport deals but that you had sent the wrong signals, disturbingly, abroad. However, one of your strongest allies appeared to utterly reject this or any criticism that you may have defaulted to act since you took over. He believed that 6 months is no where near enough to judge you and he felt that people were being totally unreasonable and uncharitable in their assessment of your own personal performance. He specifically referred to "delicate manoeuvres" that you have to take to avoid offending or losing the centre ground which, if it collapsed, could spell doom for the country. What was required was a gradual but firm approach and you were doing your very best in the circumstances. The others - the majority - nonetheless maintained their position!

• The speech in Parliament was universally acclaimed as brilliant but they more or less did endorse the line that I took in my own commentary on it in Focus Vol 2 No 7. What they were looking for was a smaller and more compact "wish basket" with pragmatic and readily executable projects that addressed the basic things that will affect the people in the immediate future and certainly, crucially, at the present moment. I remember one of them saying something like "What I would have expected was for him to tell Parliament that this was not the time for big wishes. We have had a war that has ruined everything for us. Once we have ended it, our expectations should be as follows, considering the devastation that the war has caused for us..." Most felt that people should be prepared now for the tough times ahead. There was unanimity for policies for empowerment, ie policies that would enable the people to survive, rebuild their lives and create conditions for self help and self-dependence such that could help them grow what to eat and rebuild their own environments. The culture of foreign aid being a panacea should be discouraged. It was recognised that a greater degree of devolution of power from Freetown to the people up country would be a welcome move. It would also reduce the prospects for conflict for political power at the centre. Policies for the people should be best conceived among them, and be implemented by them, using local resources, with the help of NGOs. They felt they could support and finance such programmes for as long as was necessary.

• Sierra Leone realistically can only expect one-eighth of the money recently promised by donors. I was shocked to learn that even this is not necessarily new money, but includes money previously committed, for other aid operations, to Sierra Leone. In other words the $212 million recently pledged is to a large extent, probably, beyond our grasp for the moment. They were not optimistic about any major investment or donations "because the donors have seen nothing to indicate that their moneys will be spent properly and for practical purposes" - their words not mine. It was further suggested, following from that, that you personally should be more visibly stating the values that the country should be cultivating, on radio, as often as possible. I was therefore reassured when you told me about your speech at FBC. (Could you please fax me, as promised, the text of that speech!)

• Following from that last point, corruption in Sierra Leone and the role of the neo-patrimonial state was a dominant issue at this meeting. There was complete agreement that even before the war ends, your most urgent and immediate task is to tackle this problem of state corruption. You have to act against the individuals, especially your Ministers, on the slightest indication of impropriety, and senior civil servants who are corrupt or have a reputation for corruption. While it may be difficult to prove their corruption because others will be afraid to give evidence (against their "bosses"), you should act against these people if there is any doubt about their probity. If you do not wish to sack them outright you could nonetheless act by moving them from their sensitive posts to areas where their activities can be contained or less harmful. It was said that this is the main reason why donors are slow in delivering their promises and that most are unlikely to fulfil them for as long as they perceive most state functionaries in the country to be corrupt.

• There was unanimous view that the policy of settling the civil war by negotiation and hopefully by the signing of the peace accord should be pursued with all speed and greater vigour. A comprehensive peace agreement was the best guarantee of stability. It must also address the causes of the war. It would not be right that the RUF just melted out of sight only for the country to ease itself back into the corrupt and unjust conditions, and the political chicanery and indifference that every body disapproved of during the rule of the APC and the NPRC. Those conditions that could remotely be deemed to have acted as catalysts for the young men and women of the RUF to take up arms still need to be addressed even if the RUF failed to articulate them during their vicious campaign of atrocities against their own compatriots. Even your supporter was of this view and in fact clearly stated that they would find it very difficult to commit any resources to a country that was still in a state of belligerence. It did not matter who was in the wrong.

• The war was a complete impediment to Sierra Leone's chances of winning the generous support of the international community. There are plenty of stable countries competing for the same resources and donors would rather contribute to their development programmes than to Sierra Leone which was still at war! I was therefore extremely thrilled that you were able to get Cpl Foday Sankoh to agree to the substance of the communiqué of 20 November, so soon after that. I hope he can to deliver. It would make the task of reconstruction a lot less painful.

• It was acknowledged that the Kamajoh phenomenon was a positive development for the country but it needed to be put under proper control. If it was allowed to go off at a tangent from the regular army, then we would be courting disaster and some reference was made to the Interhamwe in Rwanda. That was clearly an exaggeration but the fact that this was mentioned at all indicated to me that these people are already thinking ahead and are probably sounding the warning bell over the creation of a Frankenstein monster or an albatross-like creature that may be difficult to control if it were allowed to develop a momentum or a mind of its own. Should it ever come to be perceived by others in another part of the country, or across the political divide, as a kind of regional power symbol (for the South and East), then others too might be tempted to organise a similar but rival group - the perfect scenario for another conflict. This may be a fanciful delight of the academicians who were present but I would not discount, off hand, the inherent danger that lies in this development. Let's just say it should be watched very closely. Captain Hinga Norman should therefore be discouraged from any attempt to glorify the Kamajohs, either as his creation - hence his personal army - or as a rival organisation to the regular army. In this respect, I was very pleased to hear of your speech during your recent (but long overdue!) visit to Bo, when you advised the two - the army and the Kamajohs - to complement each other rather become rivals. That was timely advice and I do very much hope that both sides will comply with it.

• My final point is just a passing thought that I feel I must share with you. I know that you are even more familiar than myself with the process I am advocating but I still wish to put it on record. I am firmly of the opinion that you are being let down by the team. By now you could have made greater strides, despite all the economic and political hurdles in your way. From this distance I notice that there has been lack of monitoring of, and focus for ministerial performance. I think every minister should be set a target for their respective ministries. Piecemeal and day to day development of policy or projects at ministerial whim is not the right way to go about things. They should be set specific targets and be given a time scale in which to perform. They should be focused on those targets and priorities only, and be monitored in respect of performance based on pre-agreed standards. It is not enough that a minister says he or she will build 10,000 houses. They should say precisely how much money it will cost, how long it will take to deliver, and what will be the quality of the houses. They should justify the resources they request, give account of its use, with explanations for any time lag, and the quality of their accomplishment should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny by independent assessors. I need hardly stress that all this should be conducted within the context, or framework, of an overall national strategy with a short list of identified national goals and priorities to address basic bread and butter issues that will affect the vast majority of the population for the foreseeable future. No minister should go outside these targets once agreed and they should forfeit their office if they fail to perform them.

Kindest regards

(AmbroseGanda