THEY CAME, THEY SAW, …BUT DID THEY INFECT?

Introduction

'Veni, vidi, vinci' (I came, I saw, I conquered) was how the soldier, Julius Caesar, boasted to the Roman senate upon his return to Rome, following his successful campaigns in Egypt, Syria and Pontus in 47 BC. The clear signal to friends and foe alike was unmistakable; Caesar was back, from his campaign in the North, where he easily defeated the ambitious Pharnaces II, son of the Mithridates, who had invaded the province of Asia. Some historians say that it became Caesar's slogan whenever he conquered new provinces for the Romans.

The same is not true of either UNAMSIL or their predecessors ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

ECOMOG came, saw and did not conquer. They came with a mandate, from the Nigerian military dictator Sani Abacha, who claimed to act in the name of West Africa’s regional power Ecowas, to restore the ousted government of President Tejan Kabbah and, in the words of their militant supporters at the time, to “finally wipe the rebels from the face of Sierra Leone”. They succeeded in their first objective as Kabbah's government was restored, after much needless bloodshed. However, they failed to deliver the second. Instead, Sierra Leoneans were fed daily with unsubstantiated claims of impending victory over the rebels, which were punctuated with an infinite string of illusory 'mopping-up' operations. In fact, the rebel opposition was becoming more reckless and ruthless in its operations. Eventually there were last minute peace talks in Lomé (Republic of Togo) in July 1999. Ecomog did not conquer the rebels but gave them a bloody nose, though it, too, suffered huge losses including many dead and seriously wounded. But they checked the rebel advances and punctured their confidence, except on the one notable occasion when the rebels, spearheaded by ex Sierra Leone Army soldiers, breached Freetown's defences in January 1999, and thousands of innocent citizens were slaughtered.

UNAMSIL on the other hand has come, seen and has yet to conquer. That is probably because its campaign in Sierra Leone is a very different one altogether. Conquering was never part of the UNAMSIL mandate. They are in Sierra Leone to keep the peace, albeit a peace that does not as yet fully exist. The outfit has been dogged by the Sierra Leone public's misunderstanding of its proper role and about the nature, scope, and extent of its mandate right from the start of its operations. Sierra Leoneans, who had been led to believe that the UN outfit would take the rebels on with full force, soon realised the contrary to their shock horror and disappointment. They became openly hostile to UNAMSIL and began to make disparaging remarks about its effectiveness. In military terms, this has made UNAMSIL's more-than-one-year experience in Sierra Leone a far from happy one for its members. But why Sierra Leoneans believed that UNAMSIL could do a better job than the brave and well-trained Nigerians, who threw everything at the rebels, still remains a cause for amazement!

Lately there have been marked improvements in relations with the Sierra Leone public, to which a much appreciated but still ambivalent British military presence has contributed largely. Although it had a shaky start, UNAMSIL’s operations have steadied in the last six months, and it has managed to reassert its influence on the scene with greater confidence and effectiveness, thanks again to the overtly bashful British who are irritatingly reluctant to place themselves directly under the UN mandate. UNAMSIL has been carrying out its mandate, negotiating with the RUF and the CDF whenever possible, and have been deploying their troops in those areas that have been voluntarily ceded by militias on all sides. The process is gathering pace and UNAMSIL seems, at last, to be at ease with itself.

Extra-military consequences - the HIV/AIDS factor

So much then, for the pursuit and attainment of military objectives. But now, if having come and seen, and neither ECOMOG nor UNAMSIL have conquered in Sierra Leone, what then, you may ask, have they done? Certainly, as our brief account above shows, a lot! However, what really concern us most in the rest of this commentary are those extra-military aspects of the presence of UNAMSIL and ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.

In the absence of the UN report, which we hope will be out very soon, we take our cue from selected parts of the article in the Guardian (UK): War injects Aids into the tragedy of Sierra Leone, written by its correspondent in Freetown, James Astill. This one, for example, charges that:

'The war has also brought thousands of peacekeeping troops into Sierra Leone. Heavily infected states from which they have been drawn include Zambia, Kenya, and Nigeria. One study found that of 800 of these troops tested for AIDS (mainly Nigerians), 700 proved positive - though again, the test was given only to those soldiers showing symptoms.'

In terms of Sierra Leone's future, this will rank as the sting in the tail. Three brief comments will suffice for now:

First, this revelation confirms strong rumours sometime in May and June last year, which dissipated as soon as they had begun, that contingents had been seconded to serve with UNAMSIL from East African countries that were already known to have a high prevalence of the HIV/AIDS infection. Fears were expressed privately that soldiers being sent to Sierra Leone would quite probably be carriers of the virus. The latter claim may well have been an emotive exaggeration but the substance of that rumour is now confirmed in the quote above. The news was suppressed at the material time possibly because of the fear of offending the countries concerned and being seen as obstructing the UN’s effort to bring order to Sierra Leone.

Second, the article tells us explicitly that there is a significant number of carriers of the deadly HIV/AIDS virus among our would-be liberators and peacemakers. It is not being suggested in this commentary that UNAMSIL troops are responsible for HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. As discussed before and afterwards, there is and was already HIV/AIDS in the country. Why this particular revelation should concern us is because of the truism that ‘no man/woman is an island’. We have no doubt that these people socialise in their spare time and, therefore, regularly come into contact with Sierra Leonean locals on the ground. It goes without saying that such contact could well result in them getting involved in liaisons of all sorts, including sexual relationships, as will be explained in our third commentary on this issue. They are therefore just as likely to spread the disease, if indeed they are carriers, as would any other infected person; similarly they too would be open to being infected by those with whom they come into contact or associate. The concern thus expressed by us applies in both directions. It would not be good advertisement for Sierra Leone’s cause if those who sacrifice their time and life to come in and help restore peace in our country end up contracting a deadly disease such as AIDS while they are on duty. But equally also, it would be tragic if the society, which they are there to protect, were placed in greater danger by virtue of their presence, with large numbers of them as the unfortunate carriers of the HIV virus.

Third, by sign posting this fact, Focus does not intend to question the motives of the individuals who have been serving with the UN, who may have been drafted under military orders; nor are we proposing a witch-hunt against anyone. What we are doing is to raise these issues now so that the Sierra Leonean public is at least aware of the ramifications behind the care and concern that the world is showing for their plight. We think it would be criminal for any country knowingly to include in its contingent, persons who are known or likely to be infected with the HIV/AIDS virus. So if we appear to nurture a suspicion, it is simply because it is inconceivable that any government could contribute such large numbers from its standing national army, without being fully aware of the health conditions of its individual soldiers. These armies are supposed to always be in a state of physical fitness and battle readiness. It is inexcusable that their health situations are known only upon their arrival or during their stay in Sierra Leone, unless they have caught the disease while they were in country. That surely is unacceptable, whatever the state of desperation Sierra Leone is in.

Consequently, we feel bound to ask some searching questions:

What criteria have been set for accepting contingents from the various contributing countries?

Is there any regime of mandatory health checks?

Are contingents subject to minimum standards of health, fitness, etc? If so, how are soldiers checked (if at all) before or after they are selected for their countries’ peacekeeping missions?

Who carries out the checks? Is it done by the UN, to whom the offer of troops is made, or by the contributing country? In other words, what role does the UN play in vetting the fitness or otherwise of these contingents that are offered to it? If the UN felt that there was such a danger, would it turn down an offer from a contributing country?

Now that it has been found that some personnel were, or are carriers of the virus, have new procedures been instituted such as mandatory health checks on new and future contributions to the force, as well as for those already on the ground in Sierra Leone?

What control is currently in place for those who are already known to have the infection? Have they been repatriated? What were their levels and extent of contact with the civilian population? If there had been contact (especially of a sexual nature), what has been done to identify and test associates for the virus?

How many serving officers have developed full-blown AIDS since arrival? Have their contacts been established?

Have there been any deaths from AIDS among troops currently, or in the case of ECOMOG previously, on duty in Sierra Leone?

We could go on, but these are the basic questions, to which we expect honest answers. We hope that those who habitually, instinctively, describe such probing by Focus on Sierra Leone as anti-government and pro rebel, will try to focus on the issues this time. There is no mileage for anyone in raising and discussing a vital issue like this one other than safeguarding the physical well being of a battered and bruised community, which will hopefully soon begin to emerge from the ravages of a long civil war. It is a matter of life and death.

The HIV/AIDS virus was already here …in our army, new as well as old

In discussing the presence of HIV carriers among UNAMSIL troops, one must bear in mind the crucial fact that there had already been HIV/AIDS infection among Sierra Leone's own military (i.e. whatever is left of it). Again, says Astill:

"According to the report, commissioned by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Sierra Leone's health ministry, 1,000 of 1,500 male Sierra Leonean soldiers and would-be recruits sampled in the past three years tested positive for HIV.”

One must assume that these figures include soldiers and recruits, who are being trained or retrained for the new Sierra Leone army. By any account, the training of this new outfit by the British has progressed very well, well enough for Ms Clare Short, Britain’s Secretary of State for the Department of International Development (DFID), during a short visit to Freetown last April, to taunt and tease the rebels about the end not being far off for them. Nevertheless, the statistics thrown at us by the quote above mean that the new army is already proving to be a precarious adventure, with two-thirds of its intake potentially being decimated even before they embark upon the task for which they are being prepared. This would be an embarrassment for all concerned, not least for the British government, whose reason for being in Sierra Leone has crystallised into a firm decision to stay and retrain a new army. It goes to the heart of their intervention policy in Sierra Leone and brings to the fore, questions about current methods of recruitment, and health screening and monitoring that have been applied.

However, the problem does not end there because the article again paints the wider picture as follows:

"Major James Samba, chairman of the HIV/AIDS committee for the armed forces - established by the Sierra Leone army (SLA) and a British army medical team working alongside it - estimates that between a quarter and a third of the 12,000 men in his country's army are HIV positive.

This disclosure, unlike the others, comes as no surprise. Once it is accepted that AIDS is present among the Sierra Leonean community, the probability of the army being affected as well is great because of the pre-eminent role that it plays in the nation, including its many functional and social interfaces with society at large. However, the revelation is equally alarming in view of the proportions of personnel affected. Between 3 and 4 thousand out of 12 thousand is a phenomenal number for a relatively small body. In crude statistical terms, if you were to project this ratio over the entire population of Sierra Leone, you would end up with something like 1.2 million affected persons. Even that would not be far from the reality, seen against statistics such as those for Kenya and Zimbabwe and South Africa, or as shown (by clicking) here. In fact, this is the thrust of Dr Major Samba who is quoted as saying "AIDS in the civilian population could be on a par with the army…There is the possibility of seeing the same situation here as in east or south Africa".

That's how apocalyptic the prospect for Sierra Leone has become.

Conclusion

The point of this commentary is simple. There is HIV/AIDS in the country. We cannot now turn back the clock. What is needed is a massive health education and awareness campaign. Recent history has shown that the only countries that have succeeded in minimising the spread of HIV/AIDS have done so by being open, up-front and changing the attitudes and behaviour of the population at large. Awareness of risks of unprotected sex contact (the condom) and basic medical hygiene, e.g. not re-using needles (not easy when medical supplies are scarce, but if the alternative is HIV/AIDS), are essential. Real leadership, not scapegoating, is needed to confront and tackle the problem, in the hope of meeting it before it becomes a widespread national tragedy.

© FSL

31/05/01